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
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
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THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION: THE IMPACT
OF PUBLIC OPINION ON GOVERNMENT POLICY
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

by

STEPHEN EDWARD CHARKOW, B.A.



THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso

in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO

August 1984

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As an officer in the United States Army my duty assignments have enabled me not only to visit foreign lands, but have also given me the opportunity to live in some of them. During my last assignment in the Federal Republic of Germany I became interested in the people and their country. Hence I became concerned when I began to notice increased reports of demonstrations at military bases in the Federal Republic and I felt that it would behoove me to find out as much about the demonstrations as I could--including the genesis, background, and goals. Thereby I decided to research and write my thesis on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Two-Track decision and the impact of public opinion on government policies in the Federal Republic of Germany. This thesis is the result of my efforts in that endeavor.

While I am fully responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation which may appear in the thesis, I received support from many individuals and organizations during my research. Without their assistance I would most certainly have been unable to write the thesis at all.

Oberstleutnant Guenter Schroeder, the Army Liaison Officer to Fort Bliss from the Federal Republic of Germany, was most helpful in providing me with numerous sources to

which he had access. Furthermore, he reviewed a survey which I sent to political parties in the Federal Republic, and he gave me invaluable comments concerning the survey.

Professor Ilse Irwin of the Department of Modern Languages at the University of Texas at El Paso spent considerable time in translating the surveys into German. Additionally, she provided me with an excellent cover letter which undoubtedly moved the respondents to participate in the survey with relatively little lead time.

I also requested information by phone from some government agencies and private organizations. In response, extremely useful information was sent by the German Information Center in New York, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C., the Consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany in Houston, and the Allensbach Institute in the Federal Republic. They thereby provided me with material which I might not have been able to acquire elsewhere.

Members of four political parties in the Federal Republic of Germany were kind enough to respond to the surveys which I sent. They also sent along pamphlets and policy statements which were most useful to me in my search for every form of information available. The respondents were Reinhard Stuth, Head of the Foreign and German Politics Section of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU); Dr. Dietrich Wagner of the Free Democratic Party (FDP); Reinhard Kaiser, Principal

Assistant to the Greens in the Bundestag; and Eugen Held, the Founder and Head of the International World Peace Party (IWP). I am grateful to each of them for the time they used and the concern they showed in filling out the surveys and providing brochures and pamphlets.

The staff of the German Studies Review at Arizona State University in Tempe was very kind and helpful. They provided me with access to materials which were of great use to me.

Finally, the staff of the Library of the University of Texas at El Paso went far beyond their normal duty requirements in giving me assistance and running down my leads which were often scant at best. They went out of their way to get me sources and to recommend research methods. In short, they have been indispensable to me during the preparation of this thesis. While the entire staff was excellent, I especially want to thank the head of the Interlibrary Loan service, Ms. Ann Schultis. She not only spent a considerable amount of time in finding information for me, but also notified me when new material pertinent to my topic arrived at the Library.

The research and writing has been a rewarding experience for me. It has undoubtedly provided me with a much better knowledge about not only my specific subject, but also about the Federal Republic of Germany in general. If I utilize the results of my efforts here wisely I am certain that my increased understanding therefrom will provide me with

the basis upon which I might be able to continue to learn and enhance both my professional contribution and my personal satisfaction as I fulfill the responsibilities of my pending assignment once again in the Federal Republic of Germany.

El Paso, Texas
30 July, 1984

S.E.C.

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INTRODUCTION

During the past two years there has been an apparent rise in active public dissent against the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles and weapons within the Federal Republic of Germany. It is not yet clear whether this increased protest is the result of increased activity on the part of a vocal minority, or is indicative of a broadening movement against the missiles and weapons throughout the population as a whole.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a liberal parliamentary democracy. As such, it derives its power and legitimacy from the people. However, the Federal Republic is a representative democracy and not a direct democracy. Therefore, in normal operation, the government acts upon the wishes of the people only indirectly through their elected representatives.

The Federal Republic of Germany's actual sovereignty is realistically limited through military and economic interdependence. The borders of West Germany must be impervious to external military coercion while at the same time open to foreign trade. Central to the defense of the Federal Republic is her membership in and thereby her commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the words of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl as he prefaced the White Paper 1983:

The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany:

Only in the Atlantic Alliance can our country find protection and security. Jointly with our Allies we shape the policy of actively securing peace. For the Alliance links our basic values, our way of life, and our security.¹

Although there are intermediate linkages which need to be established, the hypothesis upon which this study is based is that there may come a time when public opinion within a democracy predominates, and thereby dictates governmental policy, even if such policy is determined by well-intentioned and well-informed government decision makers not to be their policy of choice. With respect to the specific issue here being addressed, the hypothesis can be stated as follows: There is rising public dissent against the stationing of U.S. nuclear missiles within the Federal Republic of Germany under the provisions of the NATO Two-Track decision. The political representatives feel that such missiles are essential for protection and security. Therefore, what is the perceived impact of the dissonance between government policy and rising public opinion?

Intermediate questions which are answered prior to answering the final question or hypothesis include:

1--What is the feeling of government officials concerning the weaponry, and are there any identifiable trends of change?

¹White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn: The Federal Minister of Defense, 1983), preface.

2--What is the trend in public opinion and dissent concerning the weaponry? This includes age and party demographics and a prognosis.

3--Are all types of nuclear weapons involved in the dissent or just particular classes of such weapons?

This study is organized to provide initial background information and then to examine government positions, the extent of participation in demonstrations against government policy, the results of polls, and scholarly analysis of each major concept in the study. Chapter I is an analysis of the effect of public opinion on governmental policy in general, to include a review of the literature and model studies provided by scholars. A composite model which is used to organize the analysis in the remainder of the study is then developed from the ideas in the literature. Chapter II consists of a history of the Federal Republic of Germany (post-World War II) and an explanation of the structure and functioning of the government of the Federal Republic. Chapter III provides the background policies of the missile crisis and the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, especially that surrounding the NATO Two-Track decision. This is followed in Chapter IV by an examination of the polls, protests, and dissent, to include current information, growth, age and party demographics, and a prognosis for the future. Lastly, the conclusions are presented and the study is summarized.

CHAPTER I

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

A Review of the Literature Which Addresses Public Opinion's Effect on Policy

One classic dilemma of democracy is that if the government derives its legitimacy from the people and governs with the free consent of its citizens, then how can policies be made which are not fully in consonance with the preponderant wishes--or demands--of the people? Winston Churchill solved this dilemma for himself by stating that:

NOTHING is more dangerous than to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll, always taking one's temperature....There is only one duty, only one safe course, and that is to be right and not to fear to do or say what you believe to be right.¹


That does not solve the dilemma for the mere mortals who occupy most decision making positions, however. The problem still exists, and it does so at more than one level of the hierarchy of political thought. The level just discussed is conceptual and ethical, and asks the question "should" public opinion affect policy. The more pertinent question regarding this study is "does" public opinion affect policy,

¹Charles W. Roll and Albert H. Cantril, Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972; reprint ed., Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press, 1980), p. 136.

and there are three possible answers--"yes", "no", or "cannot be determined."

The last of the three possible answers, "cannot be determined," is not acceptable. In 1961 James Rosenau, talking about the ambivalent nature of public opinion's effect on policy, stated that "...we have little reliable knowledge about the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy."² Furthermore, that sentiment is echoed by some of the scholars whose works are being reviewed in this study. Nevertheless, while it is impossible to prove the existence of absolute linkages, sufficient evidence exists to infer a more definite answer than "cannot be determined."

In order to organize the thoughts of the scholars works which are examined in this section, the following matrix will be utilized:



²James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 4.

The matrix consists of a conceptual side and a practical side. The distinction contained therein is that the conceptual side addresses the more philosophical aspect of public opinion's effect on government policy, namely whether or not public opinion has a right to affect policy in a democracy. Should the government decision makers listen to public opinion or should they not? On the practical side, the question is whether or not public opinion actually does or does not affect government policy.

It is important to remember that there are no absolutes in this particular field. Therefore, the purpose of the matrix is to categorize scholars based upon their perceived positions relating to the questions. Since no absolutes are available, especially on the practical side, the assessment of scholars' positions in no way intends to ascribe an absolute nature to their positions. For example, an assignment to the block which indicates that public opinion does influence government policy does not mean that the scholar pretends that public opinion dictates policy without exception. What it does mean, however, is that the scholar presents an argument which shows that public opinion has an effect on government policy in many cases or in an unexpected number of cases. The converse is true for the scholar who advances the thought that the cases are few or unexpectedly low in number.

While there are four blocks in the matrix, there are eight possible categories into which each scholar might fall,

and they are indicated by the parenthetical letters in the matrix. If a scholar addresses only the conceptual side, or if the assessment of the scholar uncovers his thoughts only on the conceptual side, then the categorization would be expressed as either should or should not. However, if the scholar addresses both the conceptual and practical sides, then they could be ascribed either constant or dissonant assessments. The following description of each of the letters should explain the meaning of each:

(A)--Public opinion should influence government policy (concept only).

(B)--Public opinion should not influence government policy (concept only).

(C)--Public opinion does influence government policy (practice only).

(D)--Public opinion does not influence government policy (practice only).

(E)--Public opinion should and does influence government policy (concept and practice).

(F)--Public opinion should not and does not influence government policy (concept and practice).

(G)--Public opinion should not but does influence government policy (concept and practice).

(H)--Public opinion should but does not influence government policy (concept and practice).

None of the works reviewed addressed only the

conceptual side of the matrix. Therefore, no scholar was assigned letters (A) or (B). The remaining letters will be covered in sequence, beginning with those scholars who fall into the (C) category of the matrix.

The dean of American public opinion literature is V.O. Key, Jr. He is the most often cited and apparently the most respected of all of the scholars who have written about public opinion. Furthermore, his book entitled Public Opinion and American Democracy is one of the most comprehensive works on public opinion available. Key did not himself state a preference for the conceptual applicability of public opinion in forming government policy, although he did address both sides of the argument as provided by previous theorists, but he was very thorough in support of the practical aspect.

Key contended that public opinion and governmental policy were connected with two-way streets, each influencing the other. He also did not limit this application to democracies only:

Governments must concern themselves with the opinions of their citizens, if only to provide a basis for repression of disaffection....And even in the least democratic regime opinion may influence the direction or tempo of substantive policy. Although a government may be erected on tyranny, to endure it needs the ungrudging support of substantial numbers of its people. If that support does not arise spontaneously, measures will be taken to stimulate it by tactical concessions to public opinion, by the management of opinion, or by both.³

Key did not intend that absolute linkage existed, and

³V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), p. 3.

he further contended that those theorists who assumed that democracy must be founded upon interplay between "mass opinion and government" might end up thinking that the linkage was a myth as they attempted to demonstrate the exact and precise linkages. Nevertheless, "That governments pay heed to public opinion is, of course, more than a myth. Even a dictatorial regime cannot remain oblivious to mass opinion."⁴

Key focused on elections as the most obvious point at which public opinion matters.

At elections public opinion is clearly controlling; that is, it determines who shall govern. The vexing analytical problem comes in the comprehension of the extent to which, and the process whereby, public opinion is linked to the actions of government in the periods between elections.⁵

Key once again, however, needed to point out that linkage, even at elections, was not absolute:

Obviously one cannot maintain that public opinion is projected through elections with a crystalline clarity to animate governments to actions in accord with patterns it prescribes in precise detail....Elections probably serve better as instruments for popular decision on broad and great issues;...In short, elections matter, and they serve in the political system as a basic connection between public opinion and government.⁶

Key basically contended that public opinion did affect government policy, but that the specific linkages were hard to ascertain. He pointed out that elections were points at which public opinion had a particularly strong influence, and that

⁴Ibid., p. 411.

⁵Ibid., p. 413.

⁶Ibid., p. 459.

public opinion was more adept at acting on broad issues than on specific items of policy. He also noted that mass opinion was most often negative, and that it:

...becomes relevant on those issues, great or small, that attract widespread attention, that involve the emotions and interests⁷ of many people, and that in fact generate a mass opinion.

Key can be classified as a category (C) in the matrix.

William Lunch and Peter Sperlich studied public opinion concerning the Vietnam conflict. While they were unable to extend the results of their study to general applications beyond the specific situation which they examined, they did state that:

...the war in Vietnam seems to have altered, at least temporarily, the normal relationship between elites and masses in the area of foreign policy (in which elites are able to direct foreign policy largely unimpeded by the masses.)⁸

Lunch and Sperlich noted that "Vietnam may be a special case...it may still be that on other foreign policy issues elites retain the freedom of action they enjoyed prior to the Vietnam war."⁹ It is interesting to point out that while Lunch and Sperlich are careful to caveat any inferences which can be drawn from their study for application in general, they are not at all disinclined to state, in effect, that

⁷Ibid., p. 424.

⁸William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, "American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," Western Political Quarterly 32 (March 1979): 21.

⁹Ibid., p. 32.

the norm is that public opinion does not shape foreign policy. The elites do what they want. Therefore, there is a difficulty in assessing Lunch and Sperlich regarding the matrix. However, since they did feel that the structure had changed as a result of Vietnam, and that public opinion did influence government policy at the time of their article in 1979, they are classified as (C) in the matrix.

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, in 1983, examined the relationship between public opinion and policy. They utilized a simple statistical study based upon what is called the "covariation" model in order to obtain their results. They noted in their preface that "The responsiveness of government policies to citizens' preferences is a central concern of various normative and empirical theories of democracy." In their conclusion they stated that:

The finding of substantial congruence between opinion and policy (especially when opinion changes are large and sustained, and issues are salient), together with the evidence that opinion tends to move before policy more than vice versa, indicates that opinion changes are important causes of policy change. When American's policy preferences shift, it is likely that congruent changes in policy will follow.

The authors cautioned, however, that this did not mean that "democratic responsiveness pervades American politics."¹⁰ Even with their caveat, however, Page and Shapiro are the most willing of the scholars assessed to assert that public opinion

¹⁰Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," The American Political Science Review 77 (March 1983): pp. 176, 175, & 188-89.

affects policy. They are therefore classified as a (C) in the matrix.

Robert F. Driscoll submitted his doctoral dissertation to the American University in Washington, D.C. in 1983. The dissertation, titled "West German Nuclear Politics: A Study of International Cooperative Behavior," analyzed domestic support as one factor which needed to be considered. Driscoll noted that in the Federal Republic "'domestic support' is a vital factor in the policy process," but that the role which domestic support plays in a given issue must be individually assessed based upon the "specific international and domestic environment."¹¹ In assessing the peace movement, Driscoll asserted that the "West German Peace Movement has acquired sufficient political influence to sway government policy."¹² Driscoll is therefore assigned to category (C) in the matrix, but, more importantly, he provides support for the transfer of conceptual principles to West Germany and the peace movement operating there.

Bernard Cohen, in his 1973 book called The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, took others to task for what he saw as unsupported claims of the effects of public opinion.

¹¹Robert F. Driscoll, "West German Nuclear Politics: A Study of International Cooperative Behavior," (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1983. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 8322778, 1983), p. 63.

¹²Ibid., p. 187.

The classic formulation--and the classic irrelevancy--about the public's impact on American foreign policy is the flat-out assertion that "the long-range foreign policy of the United States is determined by the American people." No evidence to support such a statement is offered; and it takes little reflection to understand that without very considerable refining and defining of its terms such a statement simply cannot be factually proved or disproved. It is offered, rather, more as a statement of faith than as a statement of observable, testable fact.¹³

However, while Cohen does not believe that assertions of the public's impact are not provable, he does not take the converse as indisputable fact. Cohen stated that:

It seems to me that public opinion as a political force has bearing on foreign policy to the extent that foreign policy makers perceive in the environment outside of their political orbit some encouragements or limitations that facilitate or modify preferred behavior.¹⁴

It is rather difficult to assess Cohen in the context of the matrix. While he spent most of the book attempting to show that public opinion does not affect government policy as much as we might think, he later conceded that, in the long run, public opinion does affect policy.¹⁵ However, on balance, Cohen should be classified in the does not, or (D), block of the matrix.

Harold D. Lasswell wrote Democracy Through Public Opinion in 1941. The period in which the book was written is important, as Europe was then fighting World War II. Lasswell

¹³Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 8-9.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 206.

was very interested in examining whether democratic governments could exist or if the role of public opinion was going to be the downfall of democracy. Lasswell was certain that public opinion had a fundamental role in democratic government and he began his book by asserting that:

Democracy depends upon public opinion in support of the ends and means of democratic government...

We understand by democracy the practice of justice by majority rule. This conception of democracy is entirely consistent with the traditional description of democracy as government of, by, and for the people.¹⁶

Although Lasswell was indeed certain that public opinion had its place, he was concerned that excesses could tend to reduce the effect of public opinion--excesses such as incitement which can lead to violence.¹⁷ One of Lasswell's purposes in writing the book was to clarify the role of public opinion for others so that they might avoid such problems.

One quite pertinent aspect which Lasswell addressed was the differentiation between parliamentary democracies and presidential democracies. In using the American and British systems as his examples, he noted that:

There is a rather clear difference between the effect upon public opinion of British parliamentary democracy and American presidential democracy. The parliamentary method of government as practiced in Great Britain is exceptionally effective in focussing national attention upon national questions.

Lasswell continued by pointing out that while the Prime

¹⁶Harold D. Lasswell, Democracy Through Public Opinion (Menasha, Wisc.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1941), p. 1.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 98

Minister is chosen by the Parliament, and not by the people directly, the executive "...does not get out of touch with the changing sentiment of the nation as expressed through elected representatives." He contrasted this with the presidential system where the President is forced to accommodate senators and representatives through patronage in order to maintain control, unless a national emergency tends to unify the nation in a clear direction.¹⁸ Lasswell remained optimistic, however, that public opinion did have an effect in the United States, although perhaps not elsewhere. He closed by predicting that:

If our analysis is correct, America, almost alone among the continents, can meet the needs of the time without giving up the rule of the majority. Public opinion, instructed by failures elsewhere, can demand proper means of harmonizing the use of machines with justice, with man's fundamental craving for self-respect. In America we can achieve democracy through public opinion.¹⁹

Lasswell, although he seemed to attach a future sense in his conclusion, advocated that public opinion both should and does influence government policy, and he is therefore categorized as (E) in the matrix.

Harwood L. Childs wrote Public Opinion: nature formation, and role in 1965, and the influence of Key is apparent through much of the book. There is one very important difference, however, which is that unlike his predecessor, Childs

¹⁸Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 126.

asserted that public opinion should play a role in the formulation of government policy. Therefore, he felt that public opinion both should and does influence governmental policy, and he is categorized as an (E) in the matrix.

Childs systematized different types of public opinion based upon his perception of what the public was competent to determine and what the public was not so competent to determine. Childs then noted that "...it is my thesis that every public effort should be made to preserve, and if possible expand, the role of public opinion in its special areas of competence."²⁰ More precisely, he said that:

The role of public opinion, in the sense of the collective opinions of its members, must be defined in terms of its competence, and it must be continually redefined as conditions change and competence rises or lowers. Machinery and procedures must be devised for enabling members to express opinions and participate in policy-making to the extent of their capabilities, and every effort must be made to raise the capabilities through information and education.²¹

At the time of his writing, Childs believed that the competence of the public was very high in determining basic ends of policy, appraising the results of policy, and to say what was fair, just, and moral. On the other hand, the public was not particularly competent in prescribing remedies, dealing with specialized issues, and determining means for

²⁰Harwood L. Childs, Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 351.

²¹Ibid., p. 358.

attaining specific goals.²²

Turning to the practical question; "Does public opinion affect government policy?"; shows that Childs reflected much of what Key advocated four years earlier:

Public opinion influences government and government influences public opinion....The relationship is not only two-way; it may also be reciprocal and cyclical;...

Public opinion influences government directly through elections, referenda, and public opinion polls. Indirectly...through pressure groups, public hearings, personal contacts, letters, demonstrations, and especially through the press and mass media.²³

Like all others faced with the same problem, Childs lamented that "...few of the many hypotheses and speculations on the influences of public opinion on government found concrete, empirical verification."²⁴ Nevertheless, Childs reviewed six case studies and he came up with the following conclusions:

(1) In the first place, it is apparent that the relationship between public opinion and public policy varies greatly from issue to issue. The influence of public opinion on policy varies from virtually no influence to enormous influence...

(2) It is also clear that the extent of the influence depends on a great many different factors such as: the degree of agreement within the public, the intensity with which the opinions are held, and the clarity and simplicity of the issues.

(3) The studies also suggest some of the difficulties and obstacles to the easy translation of public opinion into public policy....public opinion...may have to be filtered...

(4) Notwithstanding these obstacles and conditioning factors, public opinion does seem to influence public

²²Ibid., p. 350.

²³Ibid., p. 291.

²⁴Ibid., p. 292.

policy on most issues in at least two ways. First, it usually sets limits to government decisions...and secondly, officials are generally reluctant to take a stand in the face of probable widespread, popular disapproval....It may be a powerful instrument of control after, rather than before, the fact.

(5) Again, the relationship between public opinion and public policy is two-way, cyclical, and dynamic.

(6) Finally, in almost all the cases reviewed, the government itself, the President or some governmental department, was often able to influence public opinion considerably...²⁵

Robert Erikson and Norman Luttbeg had their book entitled American Public Opinion: Its Origin, Content, and Impact published in 1973. It is a relatively comprehensive work, but while the authors did talk about the public's conceptual role in a democracy, which was to be active and informed,²⁶ they did not provide their own conceptual statement about public opinion until the last paragraph in the book where they stated that:

There is little question that extensive public participation is a desired democratic value. But it is debatable whether additional opportunities to participate would lead to wiser government decisions than elected leaders presently make. While proposals for expanding participation deserve serious consideration, their practicability and desirability remain uncertain.²⁷

Furthermore, like many before them, they also noted that linkages were not subject to empirical verification. After discussing the public and its elected representatives

²⁵Ibid., pp. 318-19.

²⁶Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 323.

²⁷Ibid., p. 328.

Erikson and Luttbeg noted that:

...we have examined some of the possible factors that could compel the policy maker to make decisions that are congruent with public opinion. Complete understanding of the frequency or infrequency of linkage between public opinion and policy is beyond the present knowledge of political scientists.²⁸

Erikson and Luttbeg outlined five different models which have been utilized to show linkage between public opinion and government policy. These five models are sketched below:

1--The Rational-Activist Model. This model requires that a large number of active and rational voters force a group of leaders, through elections, to be responsive.

2--The Sharing Model. As representatives are selected from among their constituents, it is proper to assume that the representatives share many of the common interests and opinions held by their constituents--the public.

3--The Role Playing Model. This model strengthens the linkage by assuming that the representative does not agree with a group of constituents, but supports the constituents' views nonetheless. In order for this model to work, the representative must first have an incentive for choosing the public's preference rather than his own, and, secondly, he must know what the public opinion actually is in order to follow it.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., p. 282.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 259-60.

4--The Political Parties Model. Voters concerned with policy enable this model to work if they are provided with party platforms which they can then judge. This enables them to vote for the party which is most compatible with their views.

5--The Pressure Group Model. Organized groups sharing similar views bring pressure to bear on their representatives.³⁰

Erikson and Luttbeg quoted Key and seemed to agree with most of Key's main points.³¹ In the analysis of Erikson and Luttbeg, they feel that in a democracy public opinion does and should influence government policy, even though they doubt that an increase in this linkage over what existed at the time of their writing would result in a better government. Therefore, they are categorized as an (E) in the matrix.

Walter Lippmann wrote the book entitled simply Public Opinion in 1921. The year in which it was written is important because it was just after the end of the First World War. As pointed out years later by Key, this placed him in the era of disenchantment. The idealism of President Woodrow Wilson was being replaced by a more skeptical attitude about democracy in general.³² This influenced the writing of Lippmann, who asserted that:

³⁰Ibid., p. 310.

³¹Ibid., pp. 257 & 260.

³²Key, p. 5.

...The existence of a force called Public Opinion is in the main taken for granted, and American political writers have been most interested in either finding out how to make government express the common will, or in how to prevent the common will from subverting the purposes for which they believe the government exists.³³

He went back to the Founding Fathers and the Constitution in order to develop the basis for his thoughts on public opinion and democracy. In interpreting James Madison in The Federalist Papers, where Madison noted that the first purpose of the government was to control the governed, and then itself, Lippmann stated that "In one very important sense, then, the doctrine of checks and balances was the remedy of the federalist leaders for the problem of public opinion."³⁴ Lippmann considered the constitution to be undemocratic, but touted as democratic to the constituents. He stated that:

The constitution was a candid attempt to limit the sphere of popular rule; the only democratic organ it was intended the government should possess was the House, based on a suffrage highly limited by property qualifications. And even at that, the House, it was believed, would be so licentious a part of the government, that it was carefully checked and balanced by the Senate, the electoral college, the Presidential veto, and by judicial interpretation.³⁵

Lippmann went on to assert that the only way that the Constitution survived was that Thomas Jefferson managed to teach the people to "read the Constitution as an expression of

³³Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), p. 253.

³⁴Ibid., p. 279.

³⁵Ibid., p. 281.

democracy."³⁶

In looking at public opinion in general, Lippmann noted that the leader will not be influenced by public opinion if the results of a policy are hidden or unknown, individual obligations are hidden, or if the plan or action is remote in either time or place. "That is one great reason why governments have such a free hand in foreign affairs."³⁷

Lippmann fits the matrix in the (F) category. According to his own works, and the assessment of Childs, who stated that "...Lippmann question(ed) the wisdom of giving mass opinion any role in the determination of public policy,"³⁸ Lippmann would feel that public opinion should not influence public policy. Also, Key noted that:

...Mr. Lippmann demolished whatever illusion existed that 'the public' could be regarded as an omniscient and omniscient collectivity equipped to decide the affairs of state.³⁹

In Lippmann's own work where he noted that the democracy of the Constitution is a guise and that, in foreign policy especially, governments have a free hand, he did not feel that public opinion affected government policy in the practical setting.

At the "Annual Meeting of the American Political

³⁶Ibid., p. 284.

³⁷Ibid., p. 241.

³⁸Childs, p. 309.

³⁹Key, p. 5.

Science Association" held in Washington, D.C. from 2 through 7 September 1968, Hans J. Morgenthau presented his paper entitled "The Intellectual, Political, and Moral Roots of U.S. Failure in Vietnam." In his paper Morgenthau addressed the influence of public opinion in a democracy. Morgenthau identified two simultaneous tasks which a democracy needed to pursue in conducting foreign policy. First, the policy chosen must maximize chances for success. Secondly, the leaders need to secure the approval of the citizens for both the foreign policy and the domestic policies designed to support it. Morgenthau concluded that this often leads to a dilemma, as a popular foreign policy is often not a good foreign policy, and he quoted Tocqueville who said that:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.

Morgenthau continued by noting that:

Faced with this dilemma between a sound foreign policy and an unsound one supported by public opinion, a government is naturally tempted to sacrifice the sound policy upon the altar of public opinion...⁴⁰

Morgenthau clearly believed that public opinion does

⁴⁰Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Intellectual, Political, and Moral Roots of U.S. Failure in Vietnam," in A Multi-method Introduction to International Politics: Observation, Explanation, and Prescription, eds. William D. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 27-28. Morgenthau's thoughts here reflect the influence of political realism popularized by his book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), first published in 1948. Morgenthau stressed therein that a well-intentioned policy was not necessarily a good policy (p. 6).

influence government policy. Furthermore, he also indicated that this is not always in the best interest of the democracy. While he was dealing with the specific issue of Vietnam, he did feel, at least in this instance, that public opinion should not have played as great a role as it did. Therefore, Morgenthau is classified as a (G) in the matrix.

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba were mainly concerned with what they called "civic virtue" in their book entitled The Civic Culture. The book is a comparative study of social organization, community life, and the raising of children in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Almond and Verba did, however, assert that a citizen in a democracy "...is expected to take an active part in governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and to make his views known." Furthermore, while they were interested in description and analysis rather than assignment of praise or blame, they did note that there was a "...gap between what scholars, philosophers, and teachers have said the ordinary man ought to do in a democracy and what in fact he does." Therefore, Almond and Verba felt that the public should influence decisions in a democracy but that they do not actually do so to the degree expected. Almond and Verba are therefore classified as an (H) in the Matrix.⁴¹

⁴¹Almond and Verba utilize the words "should" and "do" in their analysis, just as utilized in the matrix. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. vii & 161-63.

The problem does not lend itself to simple or absolute answers. Bernard Cohen went to great lengths in order to show that the public's effect on policy cannot be proven, but he ended with the dilemma of short term lack of response and long term response, and questioned "How, in other words, can we reconcile the lack of governmental responsiveness in the short run with an apparent responsiveness in the long run?"⁴²

Nevertheless, a compilation of the matrix assignments given to the scholars examined is worthwhile here. Only the four basic blocks are utilized in order to simplify comparisons, and if a scholar was assigned to one of the crossover letters (E through H) his name appears in both of the blocks for which the crossover stands.

CHART 2

CATEGORIZATION OF SCHOLARS--PUBLIC OPINION
INFLUENCES GOVERNMENT POLICY

SHOULD (A)	DOES (C)
LASSWELL (1941) ALMOND/VERBA (1963) CHILDS (1964) ERIKSON/LUTTBEG (1973)	LASSWELL (1941) KEY (1961) CHILDS (1964) MORGENTHAU (1968) ERIKSON/LUTTBEG (1973) LUNCH/SPERLICH (1979) PAGE/SHAPIRO (1983) DRISCOLL (1983)
SHOULD NOT (B)	DOES NOT (D)
LIPPMANN (1921) MORGENTHAU (1968)	LIPPMANN (1921) ALMOND/VERBA (1963) COHEN (1973)

⁴²Cohen, pp. 205-206.

Some conclusions which may be drawn from this section include:

1--Conclusive empirical evidence to assert that public opinion either does or does not affect policy is obviously not available. This need not, however, relegate us to the "cannot be determined" response.

2--The clear consensus of the scholars analyzed indicates that public opinion does in fact influence government policy.

3--There is no unanimity among scholars in their conclusions regarding opinion's effect.

4--All of the studies give at least some credibility to the public's effect on policy. While Lippmann, Cohen, and Almond and Verba have been categorized in the matrix as professing that public opinion does not affect government policy, none are absolute in their assessment. Cohen even went so far as to admit to the apparent long term effect of public opinion over policy.

This section was based in theory. Also, with the exception of Driscoll, it utilizes specific American examples. A couple of annotations are required in order to link these studies with the Federal Republic of Germany. First, the Federal Republic is a democracy and should react on a conceptual level in a similar manner to the United States, also a democracy. Driscoll's dissertation supports this. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that differences do exist.

Secondly, German scholars often cite Vietnam references in their own studies, which indicates that they, at least, consider the American experience regarding public opinion during the conflict to be a relevant aspect of their country's reaction.⁴³

One aspect of the German political system which is responsive to public opinion is elections. Arnold Heidenheimer, writing in Politische Vierteljahresschrift in 1961, noted that although Chancellor Adenauer was able to confuse inexperienced voters by playing his dual role as both Chancellor and party chairman magnificently--taking credit as Chancellor and focusing blame as party chairman--the fact remained that German elections are practically plebiscites.⁴⁴ This same theme was supported by Gerhard Loewenberg, who also stated that "The electorate has significantly affected the selection of the Chancellor and the composition of the coalition."⁴⁵ Not everyone is in such agreement. In their book Green Politics, Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak noted that

⁴³Examples may be found in the articles by Wilfried von Bredow, "Der Friedensbewegung in Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung 12 (3-1982): 56; and Gerhard Wettig, "Die neue Friedensbewegung in Deutschland," Aussenpolitik 31 (4-1980): 223.

⁴⁴Arnold Heidenheimer, "The Chancellor Effect in the Federal Republic," Politische Vierteljahresschrift (Feb 1961) in German Politics, ed. Donald Schoonmaker (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. 101-102.

⁴⁵Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 222-23

although 89 percent of the eligible voters in West Germany normally exercise their right to vote, they do it out of a sense of duty and not out of a feeling that they influence the government. They cite the German electoral system in which the parties appoint half of the representatives, thereby putting a premium on party allegiance as opposed to popular allegiance, as one probable cause of popular indifference.⁴⁶ Almond and Verba, writing in 1963, attributed the indifference to Germany's bitter history from 1918 through 1945.⁴⁷ Lewis J. Edinger, in Politics in West Germany, also noted that the turnout has been high not because the West Germans feel that votes influence governmental policies, but because it is their civic duty to exercise their right to vote.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt reported that between 1959 and 1972 the average German increasingly felt that they exercised some control and influence over what their government did. The numbers who felt that way did not equal those in America, but were higher than in any other European country.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics (New York: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1984), p. 39.

⁴⁷Almond and Verba, pp. 428-29.

⁴⁸Lewis J. Edinger, Politics in West Germany, 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 106.

⁴⁹Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 28-30.

One final thing to remember, however, is that in a parliamentary form of government such as in West Germany, the head of government is not as insulated from the effects of public opinion between elections as is the President in the United States. The President can, to be sure, be removed by impeachment, but this requires that the President have conducted unconstitutional actions and cannot be accomplished as the mere result of his legitimate actions which may have been only unpopular. The President is relatively secure in his position during each four year term.

As indicated by events in the short history of the Federal Republic, the Chancellor enjoys no such relative immunity. Konrad Adenauer resigned as Chancellor in October 1963. The proximate cause of his resignation was the scandal which resulted from his illegal authorization of raids on the offices of the magazine Der Spiegel.⁵⁰ Another scandal resulted in the resignation of Chancellor Willy Brandt. In April 1974 Guenter Guillaume, a personal advisor to Brandt, was arrested as an East German spy. Brandt resigned the next month.⁵¹ Scandals notwithstanding, there are still other ways for a German Chancellor to be removed, as indicated by Helmut Schmidt's replacement through a constructive vote of no

⁵⁰Richard F. Nyrop. Federal Republic of Germany: a country study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 49; and A Mandate for Democracy (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Office, 1980), p. 147.

⁵¹Nyrop, p. 55; and A Mandate for Democracy, p. 156.

confidence in the Bundestag.

None of this constitutes proof, certainly, but it would appear that the Chancellor in Germany would have every reason to keep his finger on the pulse of the country to a greater degree than would the President of the United States. There are certainly cautions to be taken in applying the results of the previous studies in the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, but it does not seem to be an illogical presumption that, in general, the theories apply.

In tying the concepts here together with the missile deployment decision, a study on theater nuclear modernization by David Yost and Thomas Glad is particularly pertinent. Yost and Glad, in the conclusion to their study, said:

In short, this case study underlines a point still too often neglected by strategic analysts: Weapons deployment decisions are not simply matters of military operations research, but matters of domestic and alliance politics as well. What strategic and technical analysts deem militarily necessary is seldom politically easy to accomplish in an intergovernmental alliance composed of democracies.⁵²

It may be well to remember those words, for while it is absurd to assert that policy is formulated entirely based upon public opinion, it is no less absurd to completely ignore the public's influence.

⁵²David S. Yost and Thomas C. Glad, "West German Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization Since 1977," Armed Forces and Society 8 (Summer 1982): 554-55.


Methodology

The theoretical background presented in the previous section provides the basis for the methodology of this study. The methodology involved will include defining a model which can be utilized in assessing the impact of public opinion on government policy. The model will be applicable to operation in a democratic system of government only, as public opinion input channels are substantially different in other forms of government. Nonetheless, the model is useful for democracies in assessing past influence, determining the extent of current influence, and projecting the influence in the future. The model is a composite which has been constructed in large part from the theoretical bases described in the previous section, and it utilizes the most salient and practical aspects of the works from which it has been drawn. Once the model has been described and its functions have been explained, the remainder of the study will utilize the specific case of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany to operationalize the theoretical model. The effect of public opinion on the policy of the governing coalition to station nuclear weapons in West Germany in accordance with the NATO Two-Track decision will be assessed.

The most general theory from which the model has been constructed is the closed loop for decision making as

described by Karl Deutsch.⁵³ Deutsch's system included five distinct segments, arranged as shown:

CHART 3
DEUTSCH'S MODEL



The particular portions of this system which are pertinent here are "input" and "decisions." They are, unfortunately, separated by "screening", which will be explained later in this section.⁵⁴

The model begins with the simple action of "input" on "decisions." However, universal input is not being examined. Internal and regulatory pressures are not the issues of this


⁵³The use of this model was suggested by Gerard Joseph Kimmet, "The Role of Territory in a National Interest Model of Soviet Foreign Policy: The Case of the Middle East, 1946-1956," (Master's thesis, The University of Texas at El Paso, 1971), p. 1.

⁵⁴This is a very crude example of Deutsch's model, but it is adequate as a departure point for the model to be used in this study. The exact Deutsch model can be found in Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 258; and Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 157.

study. Public opinion input is, and that is what will be examined--public opinion. Within this study public opinion is defined as "any collection of individual opinions," which is the very general and simple definition utilized by Childs.⁵⁵ Secondly, the decision process is being narrowed to the overt actions which are attendant to government policy, and that portion of decision making which results in observable government policy will be of concern. Therefore, the most basic form of the model is simply public opinion providing some stimulus upon government policy, as is shown below:

CHART 4

PUBLIC OPINION STIMULUS ON GOVERNMENT POLICY



There is one transitive which operates on all of the components within the model. This transitive is "change." While it may be obvious that the basic premise of this study is to determine the change in government policy which public opinion effects, it might not be so obvious that change has its own composite factors which are important to assess, and secondly that change applies to the public opinion itself. The composite factors of change which operate on all of the components of the model are shown on the next page (chart 5).

⁵⁵Childs, p. 349.

CHART 5

COMPOSITE FACTORS OF CHANGE

CHANGE	INCREASE
	SUSTAINMENT ⁵⁶
	DECREASE

Government policy needs to be broken down into its distinct expressions in order to obtain a model which maintains some form of structural consistency. Government policy is too broad to be useful once the operationalization of the theoretical model is to take place. Therefore, the distinct expressions of government policy are:

CHART 6

EXPRESSIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

GOVERNMENT POLICY	STATEMENTS
	COALITION
	CONTROL
	ACTIONS

For clarity, each one of these expressions needs to be described.

Statements issued by the government are one expression of government policy. These statements can be press releases, written policy statements in official government publications,

⁵⁶The sustainment portion of the model is supported by Cohen, p. 206.

or verbal statements in either a public or governmental forum. In order to have relevance, the statement needs to be assessed under the composite factors of change. In other words, is there an indication of an increase in, decrease in, or sustainment of the statement expression of policy--one of the three should apply.

Coalition is a word borrowed directly from the West German system where coalition is essential to gain a majority for either of the two main political parties, but it is not exclusive to that one government. Consider the congressional "boll weevils" in the United States. It is a coalition under this particular model, whether it be implicit, explicit, or de facto. Any time two otherwise disparate groups join together it is a coalition, and here the "disparate" refers to organization only, not to philosophy. Coalition change, when it does not maintain its normal course of sustainment, can provide one of the most revolutionary forms of change which will occur--especially when the change involves more than an occasional issue. This can be one of the factors which affects the next distinct expression.

Control is important in any system, and government policy is no exception. The group or party or coalition which is in control determines to a large extent what government policies will be maintained and which ones will change. The composite factors of change apply to control just as they do to all others. One thing to keep in mind is that coalition

and control are distinct and separate expressions, but they often maintain a special relationship where one can determine the status of the other.

The final expression of government policy is "actions." All of the statements and coalitions and control are relegated to an inferior status if the actions are not consistent with the other expressions. It is easy to apply the transitive of change here. The most important thing to remember about actions is that while it may be the bottom line expression of government policy, it is certainly not the only one. The other issues, each of them, must be evaluated in relation to the composite factors of change before an assessment of change in government policy can be determined.

The distinct expressions of public opinion are relatively easier to delineate and understand, especially concerning the application of the composite factors of change. Nevertheless, there is a minor complication which arises due to the further delineation of indicators under each of the forms of expression in public opinion. The three expressions of public opinion are:

CHART 7

EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

PUBLIC OPINION	POLLS
	DEMONSTRATIONS
	ELECTIONS

The composite factors of change work on each of these expressions, and there should be little need to address that issue beyond noting that an increase, decrease or sustainment change in a poll, demonstration, or election is basic to the model.⁵⁷ What does need to be elaborated upon is a special sub-categorization of each of the three expressions, which will be labeled as indicators.

The results of public opinion polls are important, but they must be retained in context. Therefore, the contextual definition utilized in this model, drawn from a study conducted by Page and Shapiro,⁵⁸ utilizes the three indicators shown below:⁵⁹

CHART 8
INDICATORS FOR POLLS

POLLS	LARGE CHANGE
	SUSTAINED CHANGE
	SALIENT ISSUE

⁵⁷These expressions are addressed by Childs, p. 291. Polls are the results of scientific sampling which is designed to assess the opinions of the population as a whole. Demonstrations consist of active participation by a number of dedicated individuals. Demonstrations may or may not be indicative of the opinion of the entire population, and the significance of any demonstration must be analyzed in light of the entire contextual setting. Elections determine who the representatives of the general population will be.

⁵⁸These specific expressions are listed by Page and Shapiro, pp. 188-89; and are supported by Key, p. 424; and Childs, p. 319.

⁵⁹The use of indicators was suggested by Stephen L.

The results of polls are most often put to their best use, whether that use be political strategy, prediction, marketing of candidate or policy, or whatever, if relative readings are obtained. In other words, a single polling can be by itself revealing, but it can become much more important when compared to previous results. These relative readings must be evaluated in the larger context by professional analysts. Page and Shapiro have identified the three indicators of large change, sustained change, and salient issue as pertinent when judging public opinion. I have adopted their approach for use in this portion of my model.

The indicators for the distinct expression of demonstrations are as follows:

CHART 9

INDICATORS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS

DEMONSTRATIONS	FREQUENCY
	PARTICIPATION

The two most critical aspects of demonstrations are how frequently they occur and the type of participation which they generate--both quantitatively and qualitatively. Frequent demonstrations which draw large numbers of demonstrators which include prominent individuals are more likely to bring

Metzger, "The Adaptive Politics Model and East European Linkage Behavior: Toward a Systemic Theory of Communist Block Behavior Patterns," (Master's thesis, The University of Texas at El Paso, 1979), p. 46.

any possible change to a government policy. It has to be noted that the participation indicator includes both number and quality of the participants.

The complete model also contains a filter, which was called "screening" in the model provided by Karl Deutsch. Included in the filter are a number of aspects which may pose obstacles to the translation of public opinion into public policy. Included may be:⁶⁰

CHART 10

ASPECTS OF THE FILTER

FILTER	BIASED PRESS
	ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
	UNREPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATIVE BODIES
	GENERAL DIFFICULTY IN KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT PUBLIC OPINION REALLY IS

The extent of filtering which occurs will change with each issue. On salient issues the filter may collapse completely, allowing an almost direct input of public opinion to policy. On very small issues the filter may totally absorb any public opinion which has been generated.

The final portion of the model is the distinct expression of elections. This portion, shown on the next page, has two indicators (chart 11).

⁶⁰These expressions are among those discussed by Childs, p. 318.

CHART 11
INDICATORS FOR ELECTIONS

ELECTIONS	PERCENT OF PARTICIPATION
	PERCENT OF VOTE

Elections normally occur less frequently than the other distinct expressions of public opinion which act upon government policy. However, elections are the one expression which the makers of government policy cannot ignore. As noted by Key, this control is not absolute, but elections are the most basic link between public opinion and government policy.⁶¹ For this reason, the filter in the model between public opinion and government policy is reduced to only a dotted line, indicating the filter's greatly reduced effect upon elections. If in a system where election dates cannot be changed, decision makers are relatively free to make governmental policy as they see fit within legal constraints and a like desire on the parts of others who make the decisions. While this seldom occurs blatantly, due to the political suicide which accompanies such actions, the possibility for such actions certainly exists. The final arbiter of the governmental policy so espoused, however, is elections.

The two indicators are divided with percentage of participation taking a decided back seat to the percentage of

⁶¹Key, pp. 413 & 459.

vote, but it can be, nonetheless, very important in certain cases and must be considered. The percentage of vote is the proximate cause of all good or bad things which can happen to a freely elected representative. However, an election becomes a mandate only if the issues were addressed or known prior to the election. Otherwise, the individual, even though legitimately elected, is incorrect in assuming public mandate for issues which were either not addressed or otherwise undisclosed.

The model in its entirety, entitled "The Transitive Effect of Public Opinion on Government Policy in a Democracy," is shown at the end of this section. However, a couple of notes of caution are necessary for use of the model.

1--Changes, and the three composite factors thereof, operate on all distinct expressions of the model, even though they were not specifically addressed for all distinct expressions in the preceding discussion.

2--There has been no attempt to quantify any of the factors in the model, not due to oversight, but due to design and purpose. The model must be taken as a whole in context. It is not an objective model but must be subjectively analyzed through a competent cognitive process.

3--All portions of the model must be addressed. The framework of the model does not identify any single distinct expression which is any more or less important than any of the others when applied to any specific situation. This caution

is especially important, because some portions have been identified as "generally" more important (percentage of vote as opposed to percentage of participation, for example). Nonetheless, when applied to a given situation, the percentage of participation may be the only indicator which has any relevance to the specific situation being examined--or it may have no relevance or, most likely, its relevance must be carefully weighed in context and in the light of all available facts. All factors must be considered in each instance.

4--Finally, this model is designed to assess the impact of public opinion on government policy in that direction only. Government policy affects public opinion as well, but that aspect of influence is not addressed in this study.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Recent History of the Federal Republic of Germany

World wars are relatively more devastating than local wars by their very connotation of the involvement of global resources. A conflict of this sort affects every nation on earth, even if they are not directly involved in the conflict. Those involved in the conflict are quite obviously affected to a greater degree, while the consummate destruction is reserved for those unfortunate enough to be the site of the immediate battlefield struggle. Germany was in the middle of such a conflagration at the close of World War II (WWII), and although Germany's own leader, der Fuehrer, can be accused of causing his own country's destruction, the devastation was no less horrific as a result. The once proud German nation was reduced to subservience, her major cities lay in smoldering rubble, and her people lived in disgrace and hunger. The situation did not bode well for the future.

However, parts of Germany were more lucky than others. The four major victors in the War occupied and administered sections of what was previously sovereign Germany. The Soviet Union occupied the largest area which included Berlin, the

previous German capital. Berlin itself was divided and occupied by the four powers. Harmonious relations did not exist between the Soviet Union and the other powers after 1945, which was reflected by the different methods by which the respective sectors were administered. The United States was determined to allow the Germans to rebuild their country economically, and acted positively in 1949 by initiating the Marshall Plan and applying it to Germany. By pouring billions of dollars into a shattered Europe, and Germany specifically, the United States primed the recovery of those countries. The program was designed to assist the people in helping themselves to revive agriculture and industry, and to provide shelter for families.

There was fear that the Soviet Union might not be content to fulfill its self-proclaimed manifest destiny--global Communism--through the evolutionary internal revolutions which were envisioned by Karl Marx. In Europe, at least, the Soviet Union might try to hasten the process by external threats or even overt military actions. The Western powers were concerned about not only the welfare of the citizens of Germany, but also about the security of Europe as a whole. Therefore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in April 1949 as a defensive alliance designed to secure the borders of its member states, which initially included eleven Western European countries, Turkey, Canada, and the United States.

Along with economic and security assistance, exemplified by the Marshall Plan and NATO, the three Western occupying powers granted limited sovereignty to their sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in May 1949. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic created a liberal democracy for the citizens structured in a parliamentary manner. In accordance with the limited sovereignty arrangement, the countries of France, Great Britain, and the United States retained ultimate control over West Germany and did not depart the Federal Republic.

With the assistance of the Marshall Plan and limited sovereignty the people in West Germany overcame tremendous hardship and rebuilt a new nation based upon a renunciation of a militaristic past and a dedication to democratic rule. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic made no provisions for the formulation of any West German defense forces. Therefore, since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the cornerstone of the security policy of the Federal Republic.

It was clear by 1949 that the Soviet Union had no intention of withdrawing from the portions of Europe which it had occupied since the end of the fighting in 1945, and in October the Soviet Union established the German Democratic Republic in their occupied sector. The continued division of Germany seemed inevitable.

The growing stability of the democratic state of the Federal Republic of Germany and a concurrent growth in dis-

trust of the Soviet Union led to a number of new developments in 1955. In May of that year the Federal Republic was granted full sovereignty, became a direct member of NATO, and was allowed to rearm. The Basic Law of the nation was revised which allowed the Bundeswehr, the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic, to be established in late 1955. The Bundeswehr was designed as a defensive force which would assist in maintaining NATO's border with the Warsaw Pact. Two developments within the Federal Republic seemed to warrant such a move. First, the government and the people seemed intent upon making a democracy work, and were not intent upon extending the German borders. Democracy had taken hold in the Federal Republic and it seemed that it was firmly entrenched in a legitimate government. There seemed to be little danger in establishing armed forces at that time. Secondly, the Marshall Plan had been a resounding success and the economy of the Federal Republic was thriving. It made good economic sense for the other members of the alliance to allow the Federal Republic to start bearing some of the cost of the armed forces which guaranteed NATO's defensive success.

In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany also announced the "Hallstein Doctrine." This proclamation reaffirmed the West German goal of peaceful unification with East Germany, and included the intention to cease diplomatic relations with any country, other than the Soviet Union, which recognized East Germany. The United States, France, and Great Britain

supported the aims of the "Hallstein Doctrine," although perhaps reluctantly.

The global community was not as willing to accept a sovereign Germany as was the NATO alliance. Therefore, the Federal Republic was for years unable to become a member of the United Nations. This was, to be sure, exacerbated by the divided status of the once united Germany. Seating divided countries in the United Nations has never been an easy task, as both sides seek to deny entry to the other and thereby thwart perceived international legitimacy which such seating can imply. However, in the late 1960's Chancellor Willy Brandt began his policies of Ostpolitik which included attempts at reaching détente and the recognition of East Germany. The intent was to gain a peaceful reunification through normalization of relations.

This led in 1970 to the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the Soviet Union which guaranteed the existing borders of the European states, and the Warsaw Treaty between West Germany and Poland which recognized the Polish-German boundary on the Oder-Neisse rivers. Subsequently in 1973, through a mutual arrangement between East and West whereby both East Germany and West Germany could join the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of that international body.

The Federal Republic of Germany is today a respected member of the world community. She boasts a modern industri-

alized economy, a stable democratic government, and a strong society of well-educated and healthy citizens.

Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany

The Federal Republic can generally be described as a "democratic and social federal state."¹ While this is a valid description, it is nonetheless not a very precise one. As the structure of the government affects how it can operate, and as the operation of the government affects its policies, both at home and abroad, these two aspects of the government of the Federal Republic will be examined.

In theory, a democracy derives its legitimacy from the citizens. A democracy does not exist for the benefit of the government at the expense of the people, but is rather fashioned under the concept that the purpose of the government is to serve its citizens and advance their quality of life.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in a policy statement presented on October 13, 1982, said that:

Our country, the Federal Republic of Germany, was founded on the basis of the free consent of its citizens. More than thirty years ago Konrad Adenauer led the Germans into the community of free Western nations and shaped the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany around this fact.²

¹A Mandate for Democracy, p. 102.

²Helmut Kohl, "Policy Statement during the 121st Session of the Bundestag October 13, 1982," Bulletin (November 12, 1982), p. 4.

Many of the structural features of the West German government are similar to those in the United States, but there are important differences which affect its operation. The government of West Germany, on the federal level, consists of three branches--the legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative branch consists of a lower house, the Bundestag, and an upper house, the Bundesrat. There are normally 496 voting members in the former, and forty-one in the latter. The executive branch consists of the Chancellor, who is the head of government; the President, who is the head of state; and the Ministries of the government. The judicial branch is highly complex and culminates in the Federal Constitution Court which is composed of sixteen judges who sit for single twelve-year terms.

As in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany is composed of States (Laender) which are themselves distinct political entities. The Laender retain broad authority and responsibility, and are an important aspect of political life in West Germany. The complexity of the relationship between the Laender and the federal government precludes adequate discussion here. Fortunately, defense decisions, which concern this study, are reserved for the federal level of government.

West Berlin is another aspect of West German politics which needs to be mentioned. West Berlin is not a part of the Federal Republic, residents of West Berlin are not subject to

compulsory conscription, and representatives from West Berlin cast no votes in the West German legislature. The laws of the Federal Republic take effect in West Berlin only after the West Berlin Parliament approves them. Nevertheless, economic and social relations between West Germany and West Berlin exist as if the city were an integral part of West Germany. It is, to be certain, a special relationship.

Within the Federal Republic of Germany the government is operated predominantly by elected representatives with some apolitical appointees or career civil servants in the system. National elections are regularly scheduled to be held once every four years. For election to the Bundestag, the only portion of the federal government which is elected by popular vote, the Federal Republic is divided into 248 constituency districts which are relatively equal in size (the size cannot vary by more than one-third from the national average). Each eligible voter casts two votes. One vote is for the representative of choice (direct constituency vote), and the other is for the political party (list vote). The total of 496 Bundes-tag seats are apportioned among those parties which garner the 5 percent minimum vote required for representation in the national government, based upon the party's percentage in the list vote. This requirement is designed to eliminate multiple small splinter groups. After the apportionment the number of directly elected representatives is subtracted from the appointed number for each party. However, should the directly

elected number exceed the party percentage authorization, the additional elected members are seated (accounting for the 497 members in 1980). West Berlin sends twenty-two non-voting observers.

The Bundesrat is composed of representatives elected by the governments of the individual Laender. In the Bundesrat each of the Laender are represented in proportion to their population. Those Laender with from two to six million inhabitants are allocated four representatives, those with fewer than two million inhabitants are allocated three representatives, and those with more than six million have five each, combining for a current total of forty-one voting members. West Berlin sends four non-voting representatives.

It is rare that a single political party will gain control with a clear majority. Therefore, government by coalition is the general rule of operation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Relatively smaller parties form coalitions with one of the two major parties. The coalition enables the grouping to obtain a majority, and it is normal for the head of the major party to be elected as Federal Chancellor, while members of the smaller coalition party obtain three or four ministerial posts. The resultant governing coalition sets policies for the Federal Republic during their time in office, and parties who are not members of the coalition are relegated to the role of opposition. Voting the party line is the rule as opposed to the exception

in the operation of the Federal Republic.

The President of the Federal Republic, the head of state, is indirectly elected by a federal convention which convenes every five years for this singular purpose. This system of election has been specifically designed to isolate the President from popular control. The President's duties as head of state are primarily ceremonial.

One very important aspect of the German political system, which is extremely pertinent to this study and very critical to the current governing coalition, is that votes of confidence and constructive votes of no confidence can be called within the Bundestag in order to either reassert faltering leadership or to attempt to replace the current Chancellor. A recent example of the latter occurred on 1 October 1982, when the governing coalition broke down, a constructive vote of no confidence was called, and the Bundestag elected a new Federal Chancellor and initiated a new governing coalition.

It is crucial to note that this change resulted from a secret vote in the Bundestag, and it did not require a new popular election at the national level. However, the Chancellor, in a normal parliamentary system, can call for national elections prior to the expiration of a four year term. This can be utilized to take strategic advantage of increased support which a recent popular decision has engendered, or it can be utilized to verify the legitimacy of the government--a

general referendum of sorts. Chancellor Kohl chose to take the latter route shortly after being elected by the Bundestag, and he therefore called for new national elections and set the date of 6 March 1983. This was obviously a gamble, as the governing coalition could have lost the elections. Nonetheless, they did not, and Chancellor Kohl viewed this as a clear mandate to continue the policies espoused by his governing coalition.³

Political parties play a great role in the operation of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. There are two major parties in the Federal Republic. The Social Democratic Party (SPD-Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) is generally moderate to left in its policies. Lately, however, a strong left minority within the party has caused internal strife. This strife may have caused the breakdown of the previously ruling coalition in 1982. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU-Christlich-Demokratische Union) is the other major party. The CDU, however, does not operate in the State of Bavaria, where its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU-Christlich-Soziale Union), which does not operate elsewhere in the Federal Republic, carries the banner. The result is that on a national basis the party is often referred to as the CDU/CSU. The policies of the CDU/CSU are normally moderate to right. Until recently there has been only one

³Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion 6 (October/November 1983): 45.

minor political party in Germany which has been a factor in forming government coalitions. This, the Free Democratic Party (FDP-Freie Demokratische Partei), was a part of the previous governing coalition with the SPD. When the coalition broke down, the FDP joined in the new coalition with the CDU/CSU which currently governs the country, and, although FDP members are called "the liberals" due to their historical party roots, the coalition considers its policies to be center-moderate.

The 1983 elections did provide one very interesting nuance to the German political picture which may be an important factor in the years to come. For the first time in some thirty years a new political party received the requisite 5 percent minimum of the popular vote and thereby gained representation in the Federal Parliament.⁴ This new party is called the Greens (die Gruenen), was founded on issues concerning the environment, and considers the left-right controversy to be an outmoded concept. The Greens say that "We are neither left nor right; we are in front."⁵ The Greens are currently not a part of the governing coalition and are therefore a member of the opposition, but if they grow in strength they could be a potent factor in West German

⁴Capra and Spretnak, p. xiii.

⁵Ibid., p. 15.

politics.⁶

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany derives its legitimacy from the free consent of its citizens. The structure of the government and its operation are the realities through which this theoretical concept must operate, and therein may lie the key as to the fulfillment of its responsibilities to its citizens from whom it has received the consent and upon whom its legitimacy depends.⁷

⁶In the June 1984 European Parliament elections the Greens received 8.2% of the vote. In comparison, the Greens received only 3.2% in the 1979 European elections, and 5.6% in the 1983 Bundestag election. "Europawahl: Zehn nationale Stimmungsbarometer," die Zeit, Overseas ed., vol. 39, no. 26, 29 June 1984, p. 7.

⁷The data in this chapter is mostly general information and is therefore not heavily footnoted. The contents have been verified with Edinger; Nyrop; and A Mandate for Democracy.

CHAPTER III

MISSILE CONTROVERSY

NATO Defense Policy

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 as a defensive alliance in order to maintain the territorial integrity of its member nations. Its current composition, since the addition of Spain in 1982, includes thirteen Western European nations, the United States, Canada, and Turkey. Since its inception, it has been the cornerstone upon which the long-lasting security of many of its member nations has been built, and it has been credited with bringing an unprecedented thirty-nine year peace to twentieth century Europe.

The strategy of NATO in its defense of Europe has evolved over the years based upon its own collective capabilities and those of the perceived threat. During the late 1950's the United States deployed Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe as a part of the NATO strategy of Massive Retaliation. This was considered as an expedient until sufficient Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) based in the United States could take over the strategic defense of Europe. Throughout the 1960's, these intermediate

forces--including Mace B Cruise Missiles, Thor and Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and Medium Range Bombers (B-47's)--were all withdrawn. By 1969, the only weapon system with a range greater than that of the original Pershing Missile was tactical aircraft.¹

When the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces were withdrawn the strategy of Massive Retaliation exited as well. In its place, NATO decided on a strategy of Flexible Response. General Bernard W. Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander² since June 1979, described Flexible Response as deliberately vague, but envisions three types of military response:

- direct defense to defeat an attack or place the burden of escalation on the enemy;
- deliberate escalation on NATO's part; and
- general nuclear response, the ultimate guarantor of deterrence.³

Karsten D. Voight (SPD), a member of the Bundestag, considers the initial goal of Flexible Response to be a deterrent to war. Failing that, NATO does not expect to meet every Warsaw Pact attack with a full-scale nuclear response. Rather, the strategy is intended to provide a step-by-step escalation which will allow each side to reassess its military

¹Yost and Glad, 535-36.

²General Rogers is the commander of all U.S. forces in Europe (Commander-in-Chief, Europe, or CINCEUR). Additionally, NATO agreements require that the commander over all NATO forces must be an American (Supreme Allied commander, Europe, or SACEUR).

³Bernard W. Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," Foreign Affairs 60 (Summer 1982): 1150-51.

initiatives at each step, and hopefully end the fighting at the lowest possible level.⁴ This explanation is supported by Hans Apel (SPD), the former Minister of Defense for the Federal Republic of Germany. He continued by stating that the deterrence strategy embodies a "no first use" policy for every type of weapon, and is not intended to rely solely on nuclear weapons. Therefore, conventional forces need to be strong enough to provide, by themselves, a credible deterrence to attack.⁵

Conventional forces are indeed, by policy as well as by necessity, a part of the NATO doctrine entitled the NATO-Triad. Each of the three legs of that triad--conventional weapons, tactical (or theater) nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons--must be adequately strong in order to maintain the triad and thereby maintain the feasibility of Flexible Response.⁶ The importance of conventional forces in that doctrine cannot be overstated, and General Rogers is convinced that:

The destructive power of nuclear weapons and the grave risk of rapid escalation to a general nuclear exchange which could result from the first use of theater nuclear weapons are persuasive arguments for keeping the nuclear

⁴Karsten D. Voight, "Das Risiko eines begrenzten Nuklearkrieges in Europa: Zur Diskussion ueber die westliche Militaerdoktrin und den NATO-Doppelbeschluss vom Dezember 1979," Europa-Archiv 37 (10 February 1982): 151.

⁵Hans Apel, "Zur Diskussion ueber der Strategie der NATO: Ueberlegungen zu dem Beitrag 'Kernwaffen und das Atlantische Buendnis'," Europa-Archiv 37 (10 June 1982): 356.

⁶Voight, p. 156.

threshold in Europe as high as possible. That can only be done by maintaining adequate conventional forces, the third leg of our triad.⁷

The need to maintain adequate conventional forces does not, however, obviate the necessity to retain viable nuclear forces--the other two legs in the triad. In October 1979 then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated that the withdrawal of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces during the 1960's was a "wrong step. They should have been modernized rather than dismantled."⁸ The Economist contended that nuclear weapons are helping to secure the peace, and that influential publication went so far as to state in 1981 that:

The likeliest explanation of the fact that there has been peace in Europe for the past 36 years is that the Russians have thought it too risky to apply military pressure to western Europe. If western Europe stripped itself of nuclear weapons, that risk would be greatly reduced.⁹

Having weapons as a deterrence and having weapons for possible use are, however, not the same. NATO has no intention of activating nuclear weapons just to show that they have the capability. In an address to the Bundestag on November 21, 1983, Chancellor Helmut Kohl cited President Reagan's personal commitment to this principle. In a 10 November, 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet, President Reagan, as quoted by Chancellor Kohl, stated unequivocally that:

⁷Rogers, p. 1151.

⁸Helmut Schmidt quoted in Yost and Glad, p. 536.

⁹"Don't ban the bomb," The Economist, August 8-14, 1981, p. 10.

A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure that they cannot be used--ever.¹⁰

On June 10, 1982, the representatives of the sixteen NATO members reaffirmed their dedication to the purpose of the alliance. In Bonn, the representatives declared, in part, that:

(a) Our purpose is to prevent war and, while safeguarding democracy, to build the foundations of lasting peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack...

(b) Our purpose is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of conventional and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggression and intimidation...

(c) Our purpose is to have a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level, thereby strengthening peace and international security...

(d) Our purpose is to develop substantial and balanced East-West relations aimed at genuine detente...¹¹

In his address to the Bundestag on November 21, 1983, Chancellor Kohl reiterated that the NATO alliance is defensive and that its main purpose is to deter war and thereby secure peace and freedom. In his address he directly quoted the NATO declaration that "None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack."¹²

Although NATO doctrine does not rely exclusively on

¹⁰Helmut Kohl, "Regierungserklaerung des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Helmut Kohl, vor dem Bundestag am 21. November 1983 zum Doppelbeschluss der NATO und zum Stand der INF-Verhandlungen," Europa-Archiv 39 (4-1984): D98.

¹¹"North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Documents from the Bonn Summit," International Legal Materials 21 (July 1982): 905.

¹²Kohl, "Regierungserklaerung am 21. November 1983," p. D93.

the use of nuclear weapons, and although NATO has clearly stated its intent to use any weapon only after having been attacked, the fact is that nuclear weapons are two-thirds of the triad doctrine. The Flexible Response doctrine, as explained earlier by Karsten Voight, is really a theory. Therefore, in order to provide both sides of the argument, Herr Voight noted that the possibility of limiting nuclear escalation through a step-by-step approach is questioned. He pointed out that many critics in the West feel that such limitations, regionalization, and halting of nuclear exchanges are just not possible.¹³

Indeed, McGeorge Bundy, George Keenan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1982 that:

It is time to recognize that no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited. Every serious analysis and every military exercise, for over 25 years, has demonstrated that even the most restrained battlefield use would be extremely destructive to civilian life and property. There is no way for anyone to have any confidence that such a nuclear action will not lead to further and more devastating exchanges. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none.

The one clearly definable firebreak against the worldwide disaster of general nuclear war is the one that stands between all other kinds of conflict and any use whatsoever of nuclear weapons. To keep that firebreak wide and strong is in the deepest interest of all mankind.

They continued by exhorting NATO to move to a "no first use"

¹³Voight, p. 153.

policy, which they admit will require a strengthened conventional force.¹⁴

This argument did not find universal appeal throughout the West. A number of prominent West Germans provided a response which held that a nuclear deterrent is not only necessary but has kept the peace in Europe for thirty-five years.¹⁵ They contended that the primary goal of the NATO Flexible Response strategy is the prevention of war, but that the strategy requires three commitments from the Alliance members:

- the political determination of all Alliance members to resist jointly any form of aggression or blackmail;
- the capability of the Alliance to react effectively at every level of aggression; and
- the flexibility to choose between different possible reactions--conventional or nuclear.¹⁶

Hans Apel also questioned some of the points expressed by Bundy, Keenan, McNamara, and Smith. Apel noted that it is at least uncertain that it would be impossible to control nuclear escalation during a war. He does, however, agree fully that a strong conventional force is an absolute

¹⁴McGeorge Bundy et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs 60 (Spring 1982): 757 & 759.

¹⁵These prominent West Germans are Karl Kaiser, Director of Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn; Georg Leber (SPD), Bundestag; Alois Mertes (CDU), Bundestag; and Franz-Josef Schulze, retired General and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe from 1977-1979; Karl Kaiser et al., "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," Foreign Affairs 60 (Summer 1982): 1157-70.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1158-59.

necessity in order to maintain the nuclear threshold at the highest level possible.¹⁷

Universal consensus does not exist concerning the proper strategy for NATO concerning the use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, there are a number of conclusions about NATO strategy which can be drawn, and they are accepted by the NATO members at the governmental level at least.

1--Each leg of the NATO-Triad is a necessary portion of the NATO strategy.

2--The conventional leg of the triad must be strong and viable in order to keep the threshold of the two nuclear legs as absolutely high as possible.

3--Nuclear weapons are for deterrence and not for use, but a declaration of "no first use" would eliminate their deterrence value.

4--No part of the triad will ever be used except in response to an attack.

Federal Republic of Germany
Governmental Policy

The current governing coalition in the Federal Republic of Germany consists of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democrat Party (FDP). The FDP members were in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) from 1969 until late 1982. As neither of the two major national parties--the CDU/CSU and the SPD--

¹⁷Apel, pp. 354-55.

have been able to obtain an absolute majority since 1961, the relatively smaller FDP has been pivotal in forming coalition governments since that time.

The CDU/CSU-FDP governing coalition is responsible for the formulation of official government policy while they maintain power, and all other parties assume the role of "opposition". In this regard, all cabinet ministers are members of the coalition parties (with the anomalous exception of the rare independent). All official governmental policies and statements thereon emanate from the coalition.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl asserted in his policy statement of 13 October, 1982, shortly after assuming the office, that the "...country, the Federal Republic of Germany, was founded on the basis of the free consent of its citizens."¹⁸ This does not mean, according to Kohl, that the government operates on public referenda. In responding to questions regarding the results of public opinion polls at an August 1983 press conference, Chancellor Kohl said that "democracy is not equivalent to demoscropy." He went on to state that public opinion could not replace policy and that political decisions must be based upon factual pertinence. This may require the political decision to go against the spirit of the times.¹⁹

¹⁸Kohl, "Policy Statement October 13, 1982," p. 4.

¹⁹"German Nuclear Arms Poll," German Press Review 83 (35-1983): 5.

The Federal Republic of Germany is not a direct democracy, but is rather a representative democracy, where the general populace freely selects those individuals whom they desire to represent them within the government. The government then makes decisions based upon the votes of the freely elected representatives, and not upon the direct participation of the general populace. Chancellor Kohl, in his address to the Bundestag on 21 November 1983, was insistent that a minority cannot legitimately impose its will upon the majority and continued by asserting that "no one has the right to oppose the democratic majority decisions of our freely elected representatives."²⁰ Freedom was an oft-repeated theme of this address, and the Chancellor opened his speech with the warning that "Freedom is for us a condition of peace. It cannot be its price. He who is ready to risk freedom for peace will lose both."²¹ Near the end of his speech Kohl quoted Neville Chamberlain's admission, after his appeasement to Adolph Hitler, that "The proceedings of the last days has too clearly indicated that military weakness means diplomatic weakness."²²

The Federal Republic of Germany is but one of the sixteen member nations in NATO. Nevertheless, the Federal

²⁰Kohl, "Regierungserklaerung am 21. November 1983," p. D102.

²¹Ibid., p. D92.

²²Ibid., p. D102.

Republic is the focal point of NATO's forward defense, as her 1000 kilometer border with the Warsaw Pact countries places the Federal Republic directly on the leading edge of possible conflict. Many of NATO's policies which may be considered somewhat peripheral to other member nations are considered crucial to the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore it is not surprising that Chancellor Kohl prefaced the White Paper 1983 by saying that:

Only in the Atlantic Alliance can our country find protection and security. Jointly with our Allies we shape the policy of actively securing peace. For the Alliance links our basic values, our way of life, and our security.

Only a strong and united alliance can safeguard peace in freedom. The Alliance serves the cause of peace in Europe and the world. It remains the basis of a policy of conciliation with the East.²³

NATO is a pervasive influence on the security considerations, politics, and society of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In that regard, West Germany has a vital vested interest in the strategy and doctrine of the Alliance. Stanley Hoffman, Chairman of the Center for European Studies at Harvard, pointed out that deterrence at every level is the only sensible strategy for our European allies. Any type of war--conventional included--would likely destroy Western Europe.²⁴

Alois Mertes (CDU), a Parliamentary State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in examining security for the Federal

²³White Paper 1983, preface.

²⁴Stanley Hoffman, "American Liberals and Europe's Antinuclear Movement," Dissent 29 (Spring 1982): 151.

Republic, noted that it is not a simple task to define or identify valid security requirements. Germany requires security agreements with the West, of which NATO is the major example. NATO also provides composite strength through which guarantees of peace from the East can be obtained.²⁵ Earlier this year Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, highlighted the Federal Republic's concern about the difficulty of reaching East-West security agreements by noting that:

one must bear in mind that underlying the military issues...are crucial political issues of European security. The argument that the SS-20 and Pershing II missiles are fundamentally different categories of weapons because the Pershing II's can reach the territory of a superpower whilst the SS-20's can "only" reach Western Europe, and not the United States, shows that we are dealing with completely different views on European security: the Soviet Union evidently lays claim to a higher security status for itself as a superpower, which runs counter to the demand for equal security for the whole of Europe. The western missile deployments represent our veto against the Soviet claim to hegemony. The Soviet Union's criticism of the deployments indicates that it continues to deny Western Europe an equal security status.²⁶

Chancellor Kohl and his coalition government have enumerated some specific policy objectives of the regime since the beginning of his Chancellorship. Within these objectives, the Federal Republic of Germany ties itself very closely to

²⁵Alois Mertes, "Friedenserhaltung-Friedensgestaltung: Zur Diskussion ueber 'Sicherheitspartnerschaft'," Europa-Archiv 38 (10 April 1983): 193 & 196.

²⁶Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "How will East-West Relations Develop in 1984?" Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Press Release, 30 March 1984, p. 4.

NATO. In a lengthy policy statement to the Bundestag on October 13, 1982, Kohl outlined the government's foreign and security policy which stated in part that:

...This remains a policy for freedom, a policy for peace in Europe and worldwide, a policy for the right to self-determination of the whole German nation, a policy for the unification of Europe, a policy for human rights and against hunger and want.

This country's foreign and security policy is founded on the North Atlantic Alliance and our friendship with the United States of America. It is an Alliance that threatens no one and does not aspire to superiority, but cannot, for the sake of preserving peace, accept permanent inferiority.

...a key sentence of the Alliance's declaration of June 10, 1982 [states that] "None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack."

A nation lacking the determination to defend itself will forfeit both freedom and peace.²⁷

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, addressing the Parliament on the same day, stressed support for NATO and the two-track decision. Additionally, he pledged continued adherence to the dual strategy of the Harmel Report, adopted by NATO in 1967. The Harmel Report strategy, just as the two-track decision, focuses parallel emphasis on a viable defense capability and credible deterrence on one hand, while actively seeking disarmament and arms control on the other.²⁸ Foreign Minister Genscher's address was fully consonant with that of Chancellor Kohl.

At the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in

²⁷Kohl, "Policy Statement October 13, 1982," pp. 8-10.

²⁸Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Speech before the German Bundestag on October 13, 1982," Bulletin (November 12, 1982), pp. 18-19.

Europe" held in Madrid on September 7, 1983, Foreign Minister Genscher addressed the meeting, and he reiterated some German security policies therein:

Our security requires the will for detente as well as a readiness for negotiation and co-operation on the one hand, and military equilibrium on the other. Both elements are indispensable. The German-Soviet declaration of 6 May 1978 contains the following passage:

"Both sides deem it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed on the assumption that approximate equality and parity suffice to safeguard defense."

If these principles are genuinely heeded, a crucial turning point will have been reached. The Western defense Alliance has never aspired to superiority and will never do so in the future either. Even in the period after World War II when the United States alone possessed nuclear weapons it did not use them as a means of political coercion.²⁹

In his address to the Bundestag on 21 November 1983 Chancellor Kohl noted that we must realize that we live in a nuclear age and that requires dealing with their destructive capability as well as their use as a credible deterrent. However, we must drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons on each side. Chancellor Kohl recalled the parliamentary debate over the NATO Two-Track decision during which the head of the SPD, Willy Brandt, called on the Soviet Union to halt its nuclear rearmament and thereby avoid forcing the West to rearm as well. In that light, the the Chancellor once again stated that the primary purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was and remains to deter war, and thereby secure peace and

²⁹Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Speech at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," Statements & Speeches VI (13-1983): 4.

freedom. He also repeated six criteria for peace which he had presented to the Bundesrat on 9 June:

1--We are ready to respect the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union but we are not prepared to accept a lower security status for Western Europe.

2--Workable arms control agreements must be based upon a verifiable balance of forces.

3--A consideration of French and British systems has no place in the INF-talks (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces).

4--We seek the elimination of Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons, which, if accomplished, will cancel the proposed deployment of similar U.S. weapons. If no such agreement is reached, we stand ready to accept new U.S. Intermediate Weapons.

5--We will not submit to the restationing of Soviet Intermediate Range missiles now targeted on Western Europe in the Far East as fulfilling our security needs.

6--We do not accept the Soviet build-up in the Far East as it seeks to establish Soviet hegemony through the use of force while at the same time provides mobile systems which can be shifted against Western Europe.³⁰

Foreign Minister Genscher, in a statement issued on 2 December 1983, noted that the imminent deployment of American Intermediate Range missiles had strengthened the resolve of

³⁰Kohl, "Regierungserklaerung am 21. November 1983," p. D97.

the Alliance, and had also moved France and the Federal Republic of Germany closer on security issues. Furthermore:

The Soviet concept of "military détente", which suggests to the Europeans that they should regard their security as being ensured primarily through détente without their undertaking adequate defense efforts of their own, constitutes a dangerous alternative to a realistic policy of détente and has not gained acceptance.

However, Genscher went on to implore that we not become complacent or haughty, and that the time was now ripe to press for new arms control agreements which are acceptable to both sides.³¹

In an address to the Bundestag on March 15 of 1984, Chancellor Kohl once again set forth one of the priority policies for the governing coalition:

For us, the enjoyment of freedom takes precedence over all other goals. The Federal Republic of Germany is a free state. Our commitment to a liberal democracy is one of our Raisons d'Etat. Our decision in favor of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance is the foundation of our policies.³²

Throughout the policy statements a number of recurrent themes and issues appear. Among these are the following:

1--The Federal Republic of Germany intends to maintain both peace and freedom.

2--A viable defense posture, with NATO as its foundation, is a critical element in seeking number one above.

3--The Federal Republic is not willing to accept a

³¹Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Future of Détente in Europe," Bulletin (20 December 1983), p. 16.

³²Helmut Kohl, "State of the Nation in Divided Germany," Statements & Speeches VII (4-1984): 1.

reduced security status for Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

4--Reduced levels of nuclear weapons on both sides, leading to verifiable balanced forces, is a goal.

5--The Federal Republic has nothing but defensive interests, and no weapons will ever be used except in response to an attack.

The policies of the CDU/CSU-FDP are relatively consistent with those of the preceding coalition government, the SPD-FDP. Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, in setting forth the SPD position for the 1980's in March of 1980, indicated that the politics of peace was the goal. External security, avoiding war, and lasting conditions of peace were all sought.³³ Former Chancellor Schmidt, addressing members of the German-American Chamber of Commerce in Houston just months before he left office, expanded upon this theme when he noted that:

In the Federal Republic of Germany, as in other Western European countries and in the United States, peace rallies are being held. We take seriously the moral force behind this movement because our policy is also marked by the concern for peace. But because we want to preserve peace and maintain our freedom we, too, have some critical questions to ask. I share the concern for peace as reflected in the demonstrations; I respect many of the convictions that are held by the demonstrators; but I ardently challenge the claim that unilateral disarmament can ever achieve the goal of secure peace in freedom.³⁴

³³Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, "Friedenspolitik bleibt Auftrag fuer die 80er Jahre," Der Aktuelle Artikel 80 (38-March 1980): 1.

³⁴Helmut Schmidt, "The Atlantic Alliance In Its Fourth Decade," Statements & Speeches V (16-1982): 5-6.

The policies stated are no different from the ones expressed by the current governing coalition. The change in government was not a denial of government policies, but the demonstrations mentioned by Chancellor Schmidt were a major reason, if not "the" major reason, that the SPD split and failed to maintain its governing coalition with the FDP. A consistent governmental policy seems to have outlived the ability of the previous administration effectively to carry out that policy in the face of its own internal party disarray.

In terms of the model from chapter I, this provides a very interesting nuance. The governing coalition changed, but the same policy, in statements and in actions, remained. Not only did the policy remain unchanged, but the fact that one part of the previous coalition, the SPD, had initially proposed the policy but was then unable to sustain it was at least one major reason that the coalition broke down.

The NATO Two-Track Decision

Much of the current ferment in Europe over NATO policies surrounds what is called NATO's Two-Track decision. The two-track decision, announced on 12 December 1979, embraces the twin concepts of deploying Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe in order to redress the military advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union (Track I), while at the same time putting emphasis on arms control talks (Track II). The "two parallel and complimentary approaches" were designed to "avert

an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] build-up."³⁵

In a speech to the Bundestag on 21 November 1983 Foreign Minister Genscher reminded the members that the two-track decision was not a policy which emerged from Washington and was then imposed on the Europeans. In fact, the Europeans themselves, including then Chancellor Schmidt, were the first to point out the danger of the Soviet arms build-up. Genscher stated that:

This aroused anxiety that this build-up could result in Western Europe being decoupled from the United States and hence prompted the Europeans to broach the question of Western modernization. The implementation of the two-track decision is not a favour Europe is granting to the United States, but a contribution the United States is providing to European security.³⁶

As recounted by Gerhard Wettig, the route to the two-track decision began on the Soviet side. In 1976 the Soviet Union began to replace its SS-4 and SS-5 Rockets with the SS-20's. This modernization program was both a quantitative and a qualitative improvement. Not only were the new missiles capable of carrying three warheads each, but the launchers were also re-loadable. Furthermore, the weapons were mobile and more accurate than their predecessors. This upset the balance in the European theater which, from the Western stand-

³⁵"The NATO Two-Track Decision," Bulletin (20 December 1983), pp. 19-20.

³⁶Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Speech in the Bundestag Debate of 21 November 1983 on the NATO Two-Track Decision and the State of the Geneva INF talks," Bulletin (20 December 1983), p. 11.

point, was just as important as the global balance.³⁷

Therefore, as a result of the Western desire to regain once again military balance in Europe, the NATO Two-Track decision was adopted at a special meeting of the NATO members' Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979. The communiqué noted that Soviet modernization had caused an unacceptable imbalance which needed to be redressed:

[T]hese recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible...the overall interest of the Alliance could best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

The specifics of the proposal included the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, while at the same time withdrawing 1572 U.S. warheads from Europe as soon as possible, resulting in a net reduction of 1000 warheads from the European theater. Furthermore, the parallel track of arms control needed to be actively pursued, with any deployment dependent upon the success of arms control talks in restraining the Soviet build-up.³⁸

While the exact conditions which might modify NATO deployment plans were not spelled out within the agreement, Karsten Voight, writing in 1982, stressed that deployment was dependent upon arms control talks to the point that total cancellation of the deployment was not out of the question.

³⁷Gerhard Wettig, "Einvernehmen ueber eurostrategische Ruestung?" Aussenpolitik 31 (4-1980): 349.

³⁸"The NATO Two-Track Decision," pp. 19-20.

Further, Voight pointed out that this so called "Zero option" had become, between the date of the agreement and his writing, the official goal of NATO.³⁹

Christoph Bertram, the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, concluded that the military features of the two-track decision seem to strengthen deterrence. Bertram wrote that as long as conventional forces alone are not sufficient and that a nuclear deterrent link to strategic forces in the United States is required, then:

1--U.S. nuclear forces in Europe are a more credible link than missiles in the U.S. alone.

2--The Pershing II's and Cruise Missiles are more survivable than the present theater nuclear forces, and therefore the risk of an inadvertent exchange is lessened.

3--Based upon their range, the new weapons make the limitation of conflict to the European continent less likely.

4--While the new weapons should provide additional deterrence, they do not present a new offensive option against the Soviet Union. The Cruise Missiles, with a flight time of from two to three hours are too slow, and there are not enough of the Pershing II's to pose an offensive preemptive threat.⁴⁰

Bertram did warn that if the governments wanted to insure implementation of the two-track decision then:

³⁹Voight, p. 160.

⁴⁰Christoph Bertram, "The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-1982): 308.

...it must be made clear that the new weapons are an additional means of deterring, not of fighting, a war, and that notions of limiting a nuclear conflict to Europe are without foundation. For any democratic society to consent that its security be based on nuclear weapons requires clear assurance that these weapons will not be used except in extremis.⁴¹

As well as attempting to place the priority on arms control and reduction, the Alliance was interested in allaying Soviet fears that the Pershing II's, due to their short flight time, could be utilized as a first-strike weapon. The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany released an article by Juergen W. Moellemann (FDP), a Parliamentary State Secretary in the Foreign Office, which stated that both the deliberately limited range and relatively small number of missiles make the Pershing II both qualitatively and quantitatively unsuitable for a strike against Moscow.⁴²

With the breakdown of arms control talks and the imminent deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, the European Parliament became concerned about the possible waning of resolve to implement the two-track decision. The European Parliament therefore wrote a resolution on 16 November 1983 which stated that they were aware of the people's fear of the danger of war. They were, nonetheless, "convinced that pacifism and appeasement policy are not an appropriate

⁴¹Ibid., p. 319.

⁴²Juergen W. Moellemann, "Pershing II--No Miracle Weapon, Die Welt, 14 May 1983, in Informationsfunk Der Bundes-Regierung, no. 028 (16 May 1983), pp. 2-3.

reaction to the threat to Western Europe." Therefore, although not binding on member countries, the Parliament requested:

...the support of all Member States for a double strategy consisting of serious arms control negotiations leading to a reduction of all arsenals, whether nuclear, chemical or conventional, to the lowest possible level commensurate with the Security needs of Western Europe and, until this goal is reached, the preservation of a position of military strength sufficient to deter aggression and intimidation from the outside and in this way provide the other side with the necessary incentive to negotiate agreements on mutual and verifiable disarmament measures.⁴³

The resolution passed by a vote of 170 for, 108 against, and 26 abstentions.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in an address to the Bundestag on 21 November, 1983, discussed and defended the imminent deployment of Pershing and Cruise in accordance with the two-track decision. He reminded the members of the Bundestag that West Europe is in a different security situation than is the United States. The SS-20's are formidable weapons that are ever increasing in number, and they are targeted on European cities, not on those in America. The two-track decision addresses this military imbalance and seeks to correct this dangerous situation. The balance of forces--the basis of peace in Europe--must be regained.⁴⁴ On the next day

⁴³"Resolution of 16 November 1983 on the Deployment of Missiles in Western Europe: The European Parliament," Bulletin (20 December 1983), p. 21.

⁴⁴Kohl, "Regierungserklaerung am 21. November 1983," pp. D92 & D94.

the Bundestag, by a vote of 286 for, 225 against, and one abstention, reaffirmed its support of the NATO Two-Track decision in its entirety.⁴⁵

In December 1983 the first deployment of weapons under the NATO Two-Track decision was accomplished.

Fallout from the Two-Track Decision

The NATO Two-Track decision was not greeted with universal good will on either side of the Iron Curtain. In the West, some of the reasons for unfavorable reaction included the facts that:

1--This was the first new deployment of nuclear weapons to Europe in quite some time.

2--The deployment was not maintained under a cloak of secrecy by the NATO countries.

3--The Soviet Union mounted a massive propaganda campaign against the deployment.

4--A growing public awareness and concern about the environment readily subsumed the anti-deployment issue.

5--The media provided full coverage.⁴⁶

The impact within West Germany as a result of the decision and the factors listed above became quite monumental. In mid-1982 David Yost and Thomas Glad wrote in Armed Forces and Society that at the time of the NATO Two-Track decision

⁴⁵"Resolution of the German Bundestag of 22 November 1983," Bulletin (20 December 1983), p. 15.

⁴⁶Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 46.

the SPD was very careful to emphasize the arms control portion of the decision as its first priority. This was crucial as the SPD could not afford to alienate one of its powerful factions--the SPD left--which did not favor the deployment decision. The maintenance of party solidarity was particularly important in view of the national elections which were to be conducted in October 1980--less than a year from the formalization of the two-track decision. Yost and Glad noted that "A split in the SPD could well have meant the end of the SPD-FDP coalition government."⁴⁷ Chancellor Schmidt adeptly played party politics and averted any such split in the SPD, with the result that the coalition government remained intact through the 1980 elections. However, Schmidt did not foresee the future where:

Diverse nonparty participants became prominent in theater nuclear modernization deliberations in 1980 and 1981. These included churches (especially Protestant ones), pacifist-leaning interest groups (such as the Deutsche Friedensunion), peace researchers, journalists (including the editors of national magazines like Der Spiegel and Stern), and tens of thousands of ordinary citizens. They have organized the largest antinuclear weapons demonstrations in the history of the Federal Republic. For example, the October 10, 1981, rally in Bonn welcomed 250,000 protestors, compared to 150,000 in Hamburg on April 17, 1958, the largest demonstration of that period. Fifty-eight SPD members of the Bundestag signed a declaration of support for the October 1981 rally in Bonn, and Erhard Eppler, a member of the SPD's national executive committee, was one of the principal speakers.⁴⁸

Examination of occurrences such as those described

⁴⁷Yost and Glad, p. 541.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 544.

above led Bogdan Denitch of Columbia University to state in early 1982 that mass demonstrations against deployment were mobilizing important numbers of Germans. He continued by asserting that "The Social Democrats are strongly split over the issue and the whole Social Democratic-Liberal alliance in Germany is in peril."⁴⁹

The SPD-FDP coalition government was, in fact, in terminal peril. On the first of October, 1982, the coalition government broke down, and by secret ballot the Bundestag voted to elect Helmut Kohl of the CDU as the new Federal Chancellor. Thus, by a constructive vote of no confidence against then Chancellor Schmidt, the SPD-FDP coalition came to an abrupt end and the new coalition government consisting of the CDU/CSU and the FDP emerged.⁵⁰

Although the vote in the Bundestag legitimately replaced the Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt with that of Helmut Kohl, and the governing coalition was not legally bound to chance a popular election until late 1984, the new coalition apparently decided to establish a public mandate through new elections. Therefore, on 15 October, just two weeks after becoming Chancellor, Helmut Kohl informed the Parliament that "We want to call new elections. And, yes, we shall have them."⁵¹ The

⁴⁹Bogdan Denitch, "The Rebellion of Europe," Dissent 29 (Winter 1982): 8.

⁵⁰"A New Government in Bonn," Focus on, no. 8 (1982), p. 1.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 2.

resultant national election, held on 6 March, 1983, clearly opted for another four years of government by the newly established CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, as the administration obtained 55.7 percent of the popular vote. More than thirty-nine million Germans exercised their right to vote, which was over 89 percent of the total eligible.⁵² Chancellor Helmut Kohl touted the results and cited them as a clear mandate to strengthen the NATO Alliance and to cooperate with the United States--thereby bolstering the Western position in nuclear arms reduction talks.⁵³

Perhaps just as importantly, Wolfgang Wagner pointed out in the Europa-Archiv that the results of the popular elections somewhat tempered the fears of allies who were concerned that the foreign policy and the security policy of the Federal Republic might have been left in unpredictable disarray as a result of the mid-course Chancellor exchange.⁵⁴ Fortunately, the democratic process in West Germany allowed for the orderly and peaceful change in administration, even though it came through the unprecedented route of a constructive vote of no confidence.

⁵²"The Results of the National Elections in the Federal Republic of Germany on March 6, 1983," Focus on, no. 2 (1983), p. 1.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 3; and Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 45.

⁵⁴Wolfgang Wagner, "Der Regierungswechsel in Bonn: Aussenpolitische Kontinuitaet nach Kanzlersturz und vorzeitigen Neuwahl," Europa-Archiv 38 (24 March 1983): 157.

CHAPTER IV

EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

Polls

Public opinion polls can be useful tools for political strategists. Nevertheless, they must be scientifically administered and carefully analyzed if they are to be considered accurate tools.

Polls have not always been as accurate as they can be today. A Literary Digest poll in 1936 projected that Alfred M. Landon would defeat President Franklin D. Roosevelt by almost 15 percentage points. Another poll, run by George Gallup, predicted that President Roosevelt would win re-election. The Literary Digest poll had questioned an enormous two million citizens, but they had randomly chosen the two million from telephone directories and automobile registrations. Due to the fact that the economic depression had swollen the ranks of those who could afford neither phones nor cars, and that a great percentage of those people voted the Democratic ticket, the Literary Digest's poll was woefully incorrect. Gallup, on the other hand, utilized the quota sampling method, which better insured that a cross section of the American electorate was questioned, and thereby provided

more accurate results.

Even the quota sampling method had its problems, however, and in the 1948 presidential race Gallup predicted that Thomas E. Dewey would win. Since that time most polling organizations have utilized the more accurate probability sampling method. Although typically only two thousand respondents are required, the results are normally quite accurate. As an example, the presidential election in 1976 was decided by a two-party popular plurality of 51.1 percent to 48.9 percent. The New York Times-CBS Television poll had predicted this exactly, and the three other national polls were off by no more than 1.6 percent.¹

Scientific sampling techniques are only one aspect of accurate polling. However, along with advances in question design and questioning technique, the scientific sampling now utilized by professional polling organizations can quite accurately assess the pulse of the public. The caution remains, however, that polls can be misread, and further, that the results of perfectly legitimate polls will be contradicted by political decision makers for very many reasons.

A systematic look at the results of polls will be addressed here. Where possible, long term trends based upon the same question asked over a number of years will be sought.

¹Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 2d ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1979), pp. 160-62. This is an excellent work covering statistical social research. Probability sampling and quota sampling are thoroughly covered therein.

This is obviously not possible on issues which have only recently emerged. Also, a number of categories of questions will be examined. These include German attitudes on:

1--Americans in general.

2--The American troops stationed in the Federal Republic.

3--Armed forces and defense in general.

4--The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in general, that is, not linked particularly to nuclear weapons or to the two-track decision.

5--Nuclear weapons in general, not linked to the two-track decision.

6--The NATO Two-Track decision.

Although there is no direct relationship between nuclear weapons opinion and the like or dislike of Americans in general, the identification of trends in this category might result in a more reliable analysis of the core question. Therefore, in this analysis of poll results, the methodology leads from the most general to the most specific, which currently is the NATO Two-Track decision itself. The results of polls conducted since 1957 by the Allensbach Institute² of West Germany indicate that there is a remarkable consistency

²The Allensbach Institute (Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach) was founded in 1947 by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and E.P. Neumann. The Institute concentrates on political, scientific, and publishing sampling. It is currently headed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann who provides many articles and books in English as well as in German. Brockhaus Enzyklopaedie, 1972 ed., s.v. "Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach."

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
THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION: THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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in the German's attitudes toward Americans. The Institute posed the question "Do you in fact like the Americans, or do you not particularly like them?" During that time period, positive responses ranged from a low of 37 percent to a high of 58 percent, while negative responses ranged between 24 percent and 16 percent. The table shows the yearly percentages:

TABLE 1
LIKE OR DISLIKE AMERICANS³

	JAN 57	APR 61	JUL 62	MAY 65	JAN 67	MAY 73	MAR 75	AUG 79	SEP 80	JUL 81	SEP 81	OCT 82	JUN 83
LIKE	37	51	54	58	47	48	42	50	51	45	56	53	53
DON'T LIKE	24	16	18	19	24	24	21	23	22	22	18	22	19

There has obviously been some fluctuation, but of particular note is that the current positive readings are among the highest recorded during the twenty-six year span. It would, based upon the results of this poll, be quite erroneous to conclude that the Germans do not like Americans. While all of these results come from a single polling institution, there are good and bad aspects about this. The bad is that the bias of a single agency can skew results. The good

³Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing' or 'Standing Firm'? What the Public-Opinion Polls Report on Changing Attitudes," Encounter 58 (February 1982): 78; Gerhard Herdegen and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Gute Freunde, Schlechte Kritik," Die politische Meinung 29 (January/February 1984): 5; and Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 46. All tables are in percentages.

is that, as in this case, a single question asked over a number of years can be an excellent indicator of trends. In order to ameliorate the bad consideration, the results of a somewhat differently worded question asked by the Gallup International organization in February 1982 showed that, when asked "What is your overall opinion of the United States?", 73 percent of the West Germans polled responded "favorable", while only 24 percent indicated "unfavorable."⁴

One other item of note is that the results of the poll are not necessarily balanced by age groups. As an example, while a June 1982 questioning by the Allensbach Institute (not included in the chart above, but based on the question "Let me ask you very generally,--do you like the Americans, or do you dislike them?") found 51 percent of the respondents to "like" the Americans, and only 19 percent to "dislike", those respondents who identified themselves as members of the Greens had a 33 percent response in both sides, markedly more negative toward Americans than the nation as a whole.⁵

There are several types of questions which have been asked concerning foreign troops in general and American troops in particular in the Republic of West Germany. The EMNID

⁴Kenneth S. Seggerman, "The U.S. and Europe: A Poll," Newsweek, International ed., 15 March, 1982, p. 9.

⁵"Domestic and International Concerns Among West Germans," World Opinion Update 6 (September/October 1982): p. 129.

organization⁶, another of the polling institutes in West Germany, has been asking the question "Do foreign troops constitute an 'unavoidable necessity,' a 'welcome protection,' or an 'undesirable burden'?" since 1952. The results include:

TABLE 2
FOREIGN TROOPS⁷

	52	56	60	74	77	81
UNAVOIDABLE NECESSITY	34	45	54	48	47	42
WELCOME PROTECTION	14	11	23	30	36	44
UNDESIRABLE BURDEN	33	38	18	11	14	12

Although the last results noted were in 1982, there has been a decided decline in those who felt that foreign troops are an "undesirable burden" since the initial 1952 survey. Likewise, the "welcome protection" answer has become more positive, showing a substantial increase. Although this does not specify American troops particularly, the American forces comprise the greatest percentage of foreign troops in the Federal Republic, and the results of this poll should be

⁶The EMNID organization (Erforschung der oeffentlichen Meinung, Marktforschung, Nachrichten-und Informations-Dienst) was founded on 1 September 1945. Since 1955 EMNID has worked in conjunction with the Gallup Poll organization. Brockhaus Enzyklopaedie, 1972 ed., s.v. "EMNID GmbH & Co." EMNID and Allensbach are the two German polling organizations most often cited in available literature.

⁷"The Mood of a Nation," Focus on, no. 2 (1982), p. 6.

considered as indicative of the general feeling toward American troops.

Another approach taken in the assessment of foreign troops, this time specifically American, has been conducted by the Allensbach Institute since 1956. They asked "If you read in the paper tomorrow that the Americans were withdrawing their troops from Europe, would you welcome this or regret it?" The responses through the summer of 1983 were:

TABLE 3
WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS⁸

	JUL 56	JAN 57	DEC 57	JUN 62	APR 69	MAY 70	MAY/ JUN 73	JUN 76	AUG 78	SEP 79	SEP/ OCT 81	OCT 82	SUM 83
WELCOME	51	33	34	12	17	22	23	15	17	11	17	21	17
REGRET	22	34	34	59	56	51	45	54	57	60	59	54	52

The results of this particular question over the years show perhaps more variance than some of the others, but those who would regret the withdrawal of American troops have significantly outnumbered those who would welcome such a move in every year since 1957, and the plurality has been more than double in almost every year. The validity of this particular question is given credence by an EMNID poll conducted in the Fall of 1981 which asked "Would you welcome or regret it if the United States--for whatever reason--were to withdraw its

⁸Noelle-Neumannn, "The Missile Gap," p. 47; and Herdegen and Noelle-Neumann, p. 8.

troops from Europe?" Of the respondents, 62 percent would regret the withdrawal, and 12 percent would welcome it, matching very well with the 59 percent and 17 percent responses respectively which the Allensbach poll received on essentially the same question.⁹

The enhancement of security which United States forces provide seems to be a large motivator which influences West Germans to welcome American presence. In February, 1982, Gallup International asked respondents in numerous European countries "Do you think that having American troops stationed in (name of country) increases the chances of an attack on this country, provides greater protection against such an attack, or has no effect?" In West Germany, 15 percent considered the stationing to increase chances of attack, 48 percent thought it provided greater protection, and 33 percent foresaw no effect.¹⁰ EMNID also asked a similar question in 1982 and 1983 with the results which are shown on the next page (table 4).

Once again the responses must be carefully watched, especially regarding the attitudes of the young. Werner Kaltefleiter reported the results of an unnamed poll presented to a representative sample in the Fall of 1980. The questions pertinent here regarded the importance and withdrawal of

⁹"The Mood of a Nation," p. 5.

¹⁰"West European Views About the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update 6 (May/June 1982): 71-72.

TABLE 4
EFFECT OF AMERICAN TROOPS¹¹

	1982	Aug 83
The United States forces in Germany make peace securer.	81	78
Consider United States forces indispensable or important.	80	75

American troops, and is divided by major political party and youth (up to 24 years). The results are:

TABLE 5
IMPORTANCE AND WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS¹²
(BY PARTY AND AGE)

	TOTAL	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	YOUTH
INDISPENSABLE	33	41	29	30	26
IMPORTANT	48	46	49	54	46
MINOR IMPORTANCE	11	8	13	8	18
UNIMPORTANT	3	2	3	5	4
HARMFUL	2	1	2	2	2
FOR WITHDRAWAL	15	10	17	14	23
AGAINST WITHDRAWAL	82	89	80	81	73

While the difference in the political party orientation is evident, and might have provided an astute politician

¹¹Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "The Peace Movement In the Federal Republic Of Germany," 31 October 1983, p. 8.

¹²Werner Kaltefleiter, "German Divisions," Policy Review, 18 (Fall 1981): 45.

with the clues of the change in coalition in 1982, the more important distinction here is the youth schism. It is not a large percentage difference, but it is consistent. The younger generation in Germany thinks differently than the older ones. Whether age will change the attitude of youth or the youth, as mature decision makers, remain true to their current convictions, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it is an age split which must be considered.

Turning now to the question of arming in general, there have been a number of polls which have basically asked the "better red than dead" question. The Allensbach Institute asked the following question:

No one knows what will happen, but what do you think? If we are one day faced with the choice of either letting Europe become Soviet or defending ourselves against such a fate by every means, which is more important--to defend democratic freedom, even if it means a nuclear war, or to avoid war at all costs, even if it will mean living under a Communist government?

The responses were:

TABLE 6
DEFEND DEMOCRACY OR AVOID WAR¹³

	MAY 55	JUL 60	MAR/ APR 76	FEB/ MAR 79	MAY 81	JUL 81
AT ALL COSTS AVOID NUCLEAR WAR	36	38	52	52	48	45
DEFEND DEMOCRACY	33	30	28	23	27	30
IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY	31	32	20	25	25	25

¹³Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing'," p. 79.

The meaning of this particular poll may be more difficult to assess. The desire to avoid nuclear war has consistently drawn more respondents than the need to defend democracy. Unfortunately, the poll makes no distinction between actions up to nuclear war, but includes nuclear confrontation in the question. A Gallup International poll in February 1982 asked:

Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say that it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?

The results of this poll are overwhelmingly in favor of fighting in defense by a 74 percent to a 19 percent margin.¹⁴ The great discrepancy between this poll and the one previously mentioned is hard to miss. Discounting errors in the administration of the polls--not impossible but hopefully rare with two such professional agencies such as Allensbach and Gallup--the single most credible reason for the disparity is that the Allensbach poll specifically mentioned nuclear war while the Gallup poll did not.

A different look at pacifism is demonstrated by the results of two other polls. The Allensbach Institute asked "If someone said that an attack from the East could best be prevented by deterrence when the West was itself adequately armed, would you agree with him or not?" During the period from 1976 thru the end of 1982 the responses were:

¹⁴Seggerman, p. 9.

TABLE 7
DETERRENCE THROUGH ADEQUATE ARMING¹⁵

	FEB 76	JAN 78	SEP 79	MAR 81	JUL 81	END 82
AGREE	58	58	55	50	53	55
DISAGREE	23	22	21	25	22	25

Along the same lines, an EMNID poll in 1982 and again in August, 1983 found that 85 percent and 86 percent of the respondents in the respective years felt that the Federal Armed Forces make peace securer.¹⁶

Based upon the polls above, it appears that pacifism is not rampant within the Federal Republic, and that a desire for peace through strength is supported by the majority. This feeling extends through the will to fight for freedom, but the will to fight takes a dramatic plunge to the minority position when a nuclear war is mentioned in the question.

The Federal Chancellor has stated that NATO is the key to the defense of the Federal Republic. Is this policy from the highest levels of the government reflective of popular opinion on the matter? Again, there are numerous polls from which some answers may be inferred.

The Allensbach Institute has asked the question "What is your personal opinion--should West Germany remain a member

¹⁵Noelle-Neumann, "Are the Germans 'Collapsing'," p. 78; and Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 47.

¹⁶Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, p. 8.

of NATO or should it withdraw?" The large majority have been in favor of remaining, as indicated below:

TABLE 8
REMAIN IN NATO OR WITHDRAW¹⁷

	JAN 69	MAY 81	AUG 83
REMAIN	80	80	72
WITHDRAW	6	6	9

An EMNID poll in 1982 and August, 1983 recorded even higher percentages of 91 percent and 88 percent which were in favor of Germany's staying in NATO.¹⁸ The lowest response to remaining in NATO was recorded by the February 1982 poll conducted by Gallup International. Responding to choices for security into the 1980's, the answer "Continue in the NATO alliance among the countries of West Europe and the United States and Canada" received 53 percent. This is still a majority, but it is significantly lower than the previously mentioned polls indicated. However, there was a companion response which received 22 percent of the support, and read "Establish within NATO a unified West European defense force under European command, but allied to the United States."¹⁹ If the two percentages are combined, as they both support a

¹⁷Herdegen and Noelle-Neumann, p. 12; and Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 47.

¹⁸Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, p. 8.

¹⁹"West European Views," p. 72.

similar alliance system, then the 75 percent figure is in line with the responses to the other polls.

While there seems to be broad support for the NATO alliance, there is a definite division along the lines of age and party affiliation. The results of a European poll reported by Bruce Russett and Donald DeLuca indicate a very noticeable change in support based upon age. University educated people were asked in March 1981 if "All things considered, do you think it is better for our country to belong to NATO, the Western defense alliance, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?" The West German respondents, categorized by age, answered as below:

TABLE 9
NATO OR NEUTRAL²⁰
(BY AGE)

	18-34	35-49	50 and over
NATO	59	63	95
NEUTRAL	28	25	5

An even more biased response was received when the party identification is shown. The previously identified question from the Allensbach Institute which asked "What is your personal opinion--should West Germany remain a member of NATO or should it withdraw?" received a substantial majority

²⁰Bruce Russett and Donald R. DeLuca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 187.

of positive responses in each of the three years listed (table 8). However, when the results of the 1983 poll are tabulated by party identification, there is a tremendous inconsistency. As shown by the following table, the Greens are obviously not supporters of the NATO alliance.

TABLE 10
REMAIN IN NATO OR WITHDRAW²¹
(BY PARTY)

	TOTAL	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	GREENS
REMAIN	72	86	68	81	28
WITHDRAW	9	2	12	8	51

The Allensbach Institute has also polled West Germans on issues which they might think are of importance. The institute presented cards to the respondent, and asked the question "These cards list several of our national problems. Would you select those which you personally consider important?" On a national basis, the response to "Strengthen NATO and the West German army in order to stop the Russians gaining an ever-increasing military advantage over the West" was considered as urgent by 40 percent in 1976, and a similar statement to "Strengthen NATO, and strengthen our military alliances in the West" was considered important by 40 percent in June 1982. However, only 11 percent of those identified as Greens considered the 1982 question to be important.

²¹Herdegen and Noelle-Neumann, p 12.

The Green party had not yet been established at the time of the 1976 poll, but an interesting dichotomy then was that only 15 percent of the journalists felt that strengthening NATO was urgent--well under half of the 40 percent of the population as a whole who felt that way.²² This seems to lend credence to Karl Deutsch's assertion that the mass media in Germany have been more liberal than the average German.²³ Referring to the model presented in chapter I, a portion of the filter is a biased press. If the press in Germany is indeed more liberal than average, then this is an important factor to consider in the overall model analysis.

Therefore, while there is certainly broad and continuing support for the NATO alliance, there are certain elements of the population who are in concerted opposition to this position.

The previous poll results concerning pacifism and the German will to fight for defense of democracy closed with the indication of fear of nuclear war. In general, what do the West Germans think about nuclear weapons? This is not presented in the format of liking nuclear weapons as opposed to not liking them--that would probably approach as near a unanimity as realistically possible for the "not like" response. The question is most often presented in the form of the utility of

²²"Domestic and International Concerns," p. 129; and Noelle-Neumann, "Are The Germans 'Collapsing'," p. 76.

²³Deutsch, Politics and Government, p. 283.

nuclear weapons in either enhancing or hindering the maintenance of peace in Europe. A Gallup International poll conducted in February 1982 asked West Germans "What is the effect of having nuclear missiles stationed in Western Europe."

There were 27 percent who felt that such stationing "Increases chances of an attack", 41 percent opted for the "Provides greater protection" response, and 28 percent considered the missiles to have "No effect."²⁴

Russell and DeLuca took this one step further when they reported the results of a July 1981 poll which asked "There are different opinions about the use of nuclear weapons in Europe by NATO. Which one of the following opinions is closest to your own?" In West Germany the responses were:

TABLE 11

NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS²⁵

--29%	NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances.
--37%	NATO should use nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union uses them first in attacking Western Europe.
--17%	NATO should use nuclear weapons to defend itself if a Soviet attack by conventional forces threatened to overwhelm NATO forces.
--17%	No opinion.

²⁴Seggerman, p. 9.

²⁵Russett and DeLuca, p. 194.

The mixed results of these two polls do not provide a clear mandate and do not provide a trend, but lead into the specific question most pertinent to this study, which is the NATO Two-Track decision of 1979.

The interpretation of the polls concerning the NATO Two-Track decision vary widely. Some very well respected professionals, Horst Schaettle and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann for example, take quite opposite sides on the issue, and they back up their claims with whichever poll happens to agree with their particular point of view. The polls are disparate enough to support just about anyone's opinion. Much of the disparity comes not from changing attitudes on the parts of the respondents, not through a lack of scientific sampling, and not through skewness introduced by the survey medium. Rather, it seems, the diversity is a direct result of the way in which the question is posed through wording or division of the two-track decision. Therefore, extreme caution is warranted before reaching any conclusions regarding the meaning of any polls in this particular category.

Approximately six months prior to the first scheduled stationing of missiles under the two-track decision the German television program Polit-Barometer, aired on 4 July, 1983 over the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) network, indicated that three quarters of the German population was against the stationing of the missiles. The claim was based upon a survey conducted specifically for the program. The television survey

had posed two questions, which, along with their results, are as follows:

TABLE 12

THE ZDF TWO-TRACK POLL

The Soviet Union and the USA are currently conducting disarmament negotiations about medium-range missiles in Geneva. If these negotiations do not produce agreement by the autumn, what should happen next?

- 72% Continue to negotiate about disarmament, and do not deploy any new missiles in the Federal Republic.
- 22% Continue to negotiate about disarmament, but at the same time deploy new missiles in the Federal Republic.
- 2% Break off disarmament negotiations and deploy new missiles in the Federal Republic.

Assuming that new missiles were to be deployed in this area, would you agree with this or would you not agree with it?

- 21% Would agree.
 - 79% Would not agree.
-

In assessing the meaning of the responses, the TV commentator, Horst Schaettle, noted that:

These figures make it evident that there is a discrepancy between official German national security policy and the majority opinion of the population....It is also notable that the deployment of medium-range missiles, as at present discussed, is rejected by a majority of Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union voters and Free Democratic Party voters.²⁶

The results of the poll seemed to overwhelmingly

²⁶Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Art of Putting Ambivalent Questions," Encounter 61 (December 1983): 79.

support Herr Schaettle's position. Nonetheless, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann of the Allensbach Institute did not readily agree, and she provided her own poll results to support her contention.

Right after the NATO decision the Allensbach Institute asked the following question in November 1979:

NATO plans to deploy American medium-range missiles in the European member countries of NATO, for example in West Germany, to counterbalance Russian medium-range missiles. Are you in favor of this or not?

Out of the total sample, those in favor numbered 38 percent, not in favor 34 percent, and undecided 28 percent.²⁷ This is not really indicative of a trend for one position or the other, and it may have been a premature question which was posed too soon after the decision for the population really to have understood or formed any knowledgeable opinions on the matter.

Subsequently, starting in 1981, the Allensbach Institute asked the following question:

The NATO two-track decision was made some time ago. According to this decision, the NATO countries have agreed, on the one hand to station missiles in Europe to offset the Soviet medium-range missiles, and on the other hand to take the initiative in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. All in all, do you think this two-track decision is a good one, or not?²⁸

The four times that this particular question was asked have

²⁷ Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 437.

²⁸ Noelle-Neumann, "The Art of Putting," p. 79.

yielded the following results:

TABLE 13
THE ALLENSBACH TWO-TRACK POLL²⁹

	MAY 81	JAN 82	DEC 82	AUG 83
GOOD	53	52	51	49
NOT GOOD	20	22	25	23
UNDECIDED	27	26	24	28

While the results of this poll show that those who feel that the decision is "good" have steadily declined, the rate of decline has been gradual. The responses have been statistically consistent over the period of the polling, although the wording of the question leads to quite different results than the poll conducted for the television show mentioned earlier. Noelle-Neumann, in distinguishing between a question which asks about the two-track decision as a whole and a question which asks about stationing of missiles only noted that:

A journalist who writes about German attitudes toward the NATO two-track decision can thus choose whether he will report...a majority in favor of the NATO two-track decision, or...a plurality against deployment of American medium-range missiles.³⁰

Resorting to a third poll on the subject does not

²⁹Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Drei Viertel gegen die Raketenstationierung?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 September 1983, p. 11.

³⁰Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap," p. 48.

alleviate the dilemma. In the Fall 1981 EMNID poll, the following question was asked:

NATO has decided that from 1983 onward American medium-range rockets will be stationed in Western Europe. But by the same token it has suggested negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a disarmament agreement that could lead to a total or partial renunciation of these rockets. Are you for or against the NATO dual decision?

The results indicated that 36 percent were for the decision, 21 percent were against it, 30 percent had no definitive position, and 12 percent were indifferent.³¹ These results neither support nor deny Noelle-Neumann's position, but proponents of the television poll could certainly point to the fact that the passage of time has made the EMNID data irrelevant in any case.

There have been a couple of other polls conducted which have asked whether the missiles should be deployed.

Gallup International asked in January 1983:

If the United States and the Soviet Union cannot agree on limiting nuclear weapons by the end of 1983, should NATO proceed with its plan to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe?

The Allensbach Institute asked essentially the same question for Stern magazine during the Fall of 1983. The composite results are shown on the next page (table 14).

These polls indicated a growing number of West Germans who were not in favor of deployment, and a decreasing number of those who were in favor. When identified by party, the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling government coalition was considerably more

³¹"The Mood of a Nation," p. 1.

TABLE 14
PERSHING AND CRUISE³²
(BY PARTY AND AGE)

	JAN 83	AUG 83	SEP/OCT 83							FDP	GREENS
			TOT	AGE			CDU/				
				16-29	30-44	45+	CSU	SPD			
DEPLOY	37	37	31	26	35	32	51	15	43	7	
DON'T	35	40	46	55	47	41	27	65	37	87	
UNDECIDED	28	23	23	19	18	27	22	20	20	6	

in favor of deployment than the total for the September/October 1983 polling, and the Greens were markedly less in favor than the total. In the face of this evidence, even the pro-American and pro-NATO Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann warned that:

The supporters of West German governmental policy--the proponents of the NATO two-track decision initiated by Chancellor Schmidt's administration, and now defended by Chancellor Kohl's Conservative government--are clearly under pressure from the changing climate of opinion.³³

Whether or not the pressure was felt, the end result was that the deployment of missiles began on schedule.

The only available poll subsequent to the first deployment of missiles under the NATO Two-Track decision provided an interesting statistic. The Overseas Edition of the newspaper die Zeit reported the results of three EMNID

³²Donald D. Garrido, "A Newsweek Poll: Arms Wrestling," Newsweek, International ed., 31 January, 1983, p. 17; and "Angst vor den Raketen," Stern, October 20, 1983, p. 72.

³³Noelle-Neumann, "The Art of Putting," p. 82.

polls. EMNID asked "What disturbs you at this time the most." In West Germany the percentages who responded that "Nuclear Weapons" and "Danger of War" disturbed them the most were:

TABLE 15
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DANGER OF WAR

	MAR 83	OCT 83	APR 84
NUCLEAR WEAPONS	42	38	15
DANGER OF WAR	16	28	14

The poll was administered in five countries (The United States, West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan), and die Zeit noted that "Overall,...the fear of nuclear weapons and war has diminished. Nowhere has it so steeply regressed as in the Federal Republic and America."³⁴

The results of a single question on a single poll cannot be considered conclusive, but the decline in the nuclear weapons response from 38 percent to 15 percent in six months is shocking.

While absolute statements concerning public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be made on the basis of the information which has been presented, there are a couple of conclusions which can be drawn from the separate sections on polling presented in this part of the study. The conclusions cannot be taken out of the context of the documentation

³⁴"Die Angst auf dem Rueckzug," die Zeit, Overseas ed., vol 39, no. 24, 15 June 1984, pp. 4-5.

which has been provided here without seriously jeopardizing the accuracy thereof.

1--The West Germans are not anti-American.

2--The West Germans are not overwhelmingly pacifists who would rather be "red than dead."

3--The West Germans support NATO.

4--German opinion has not changed dramatically over the past twenty years.

5--The West Germans are very concerned about nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

6--The NATO Two-Track decision does not enjoy the degree of popularity with the West Germans that most of the other issues presented seemed to contain.

7--The Greens and the young do not share the opinion of the general population when it comes to Americans, defense, and NATO.

An analysis of the results of this section on polls in accordance with the model developed in chapter I shows that the NATO Two-Track decision is a salient issue in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, its saliency has not been consistent, as indicated by the Schaettle/Noelle-Neumann dialogue. There have been shifts in attitudes but they have not yet been large enough or sustained for long enough to provide overwhelming influence upon government decision makers. Furthermore, the most recent poll showed a marked decline in the concern of the West Germans about nuclear

weapons. This could be an anomalous result or it could indicate a genuine reduction in concern since missiles have already been deployed under provisions of the two-track decision.

The most important aspects of the polls to watch are possible demographic trends of the future. The Greens, who have thus far been growing in strength, and the young, who will constitute an ever-increasing percentage of the population in the years to come, are markedly more opposed to not only nuclear weapons and NATO, but also to Americans. That aspect bears particular attention in the future from both American and West German decision makers.

The Peace Movement and Demonstrations

The peace movement is a part of West German political life, just as it is throughout most of Western Europe. Furthermore, peace is not a new issue in Germany. Between World Wars I and II there were three Germans who received the Nobel Peace Prize. Two of these, Ludwig Quidde and Carl von Ossietzky, were activists in the peace movement.

Ludwig Quidde, an avowed pacifist and the head of the German Peace Group (Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft) from 1914 through 1929, received the Nobel Prize in 1927. He left Germany in 1933 and lived in Geneva, Switzerland until his death in 1941.³⁵

³⁵Brockhaus Enzyklopaedie, 1972 ed., s.v. "Quidde, Ludwig."

Carl von Ossietzky was another German peace activist. He won the Nobel Prize in 1936, although he was not allowed to accept the award. Ossietzky, among other achievements, was the chief editor of die Weltbuehne from 1926 through 1933. He spent eighteen months in jail during 1931 and 1932, and was placed in a concentration camp in 1934. Subsequently released due to health reasons, he died in a Berlin clinic, under police supervision, in 1938.³⁶

Demonstrations in West Germany are also not new, and protests specifically against nuclear weapons are not new either. During the 1950's there were mass demonstrations against both the rearming of Germany and against the stationing of nuclear weapons, the "Ban the Bomb" movement.³⁷ Through 1958 this movement was very strong, and was supported by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the German trade unions.³⁸ The largest demonstration of the 1950's in West Germany occurred on 17 April, 1958, when 150,000 protestors marched in Hamburg.³⁹ This was the beginning of the annual "Easter Marches" which lasted through the 1960's.⁴⁰ In 1959

³⁶Brockhaus Enzyklopaedie, 1972 ed., s.v. "Ossietzky, Carl von."

³⁷"New Political Groups in West Germany," Focus on, no. 6 (1982), p. 1.

³⁸V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," International Affairs: Moscow, no. 1 (January 1982), p. 16.

³⁹Yost and Glad, p. 544.

⁴⁰"New Political Groups," p. 1.

the movement lost the active support of the SPD and the trade unions, which had both by that time generally accepted Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's defense and foreign policy initiatives.⁴¹ Support for pacifism was continued by a few prominent individuals and small groups, but they could no longer generate the numbers which attended the 1958 march.⁴²

Demonstrations were once again rekindled in the late 1960's when actions were taken by the Germans, especially university students, in opposition to war. The Vietnam conflict was in progress, and a group called the "extra-parliamentary opposition" (APO) staged anti-war demonstrations which peaked in 1968.⁴³

The current peace movement and demonstrations are therefore built upon an historical foundation of such actions in Germany. Now in the 1980's the focal point of the peace movement and demonstrations is the NATO Two-Track decision.

During the fall of 1981 huge demonstrations occurred throughout European capitals in protest against NATO's nuclear policies. Estimates of the participation in Bonn ranged from a low of 200,000 up to a high of 300,000, depending on the

⁴¹Gordon D. Drummond, The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949-1960: The Case Against Rearmament, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), p. 241.

⁴²Peter H. Merkl, "Pacifism in West Germany," SAIS Review 4 (Summer 1982): 87.

⁴³A Mandate for Democracy, p. 147.

source.⁴⁴ Official estimates placed the number at 240,000 while most sources, including radical publications, quoted the higher 300,000 figure.⁴⁵ V. Mikhailov, writing in the Moscow-published International Affairs, assessed the 10 October march in Bonn as:

A vivid manifestation and unequivocal expression of popular will, of protest by the West German masses against NATO's nuclear-missile plans...Over 300,000 people took part in it. The FRG had never experienced anything like it throughout its history, even in the 1950's, during the struggle against arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, when this movement was supported by the leadership of the SDPG and the trade unions.⁴⁶

Subsequent marches have not equalled the scope of the October 1981 demonstration, but the marches have by no means ended.

The peace movement itself is not a political party, but rather a grouping of peoples from many different political parties, social strata, and other demographic divisions whose main purpose revolves around the issue of peace and how best to guarantee the maintenance thereof. That is not to say that the peace movement is solidly formed around a clearly defined single issue, as there are certainly peripheral issues and there is not unanimity as to the best course to use in search of peace. What it does mean, however, is that:

1--The peace movement is composed of persons from many

⁴⁴ von Bredow, p. 55.

⁴⁵ "The Peace Demonstration in Bonn," German Press Review 81 (41-1981): 4; and Peter D. Jones, "A Complete Guide to European Disarmament," Win Magazine, January 1, 1982, p. 6.

⁴⁶ Mikhailov, p. 16.

different political parties, religious sects, occupations, and social strata.

2--The peace movement does not purport to having a "platform" which encompasses the gamut of issues which are important for fulfilling all purposes of a federal government. If the issue does not involve peace, then it is not a part of the peace movement's "platform."

The peace movement has the support of people from an amazing range of organizations. The manifesto for a peace demonstration held in Bonn on 10 June, 1982 had the signatures of 1400 different organizations. These ranged from church groups to Communist groups. A number of prominent individuals are supporters of the peace movement, including the former Minister of Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler, and retired General Gerd Bastian.⁴⁷ Although not impartial, V. Mikhailov was undoubtedly correct when he described peace movement membership penetration in political parties, Protestant and Catholic churches, and trade unions.⁴⁸ There is certainly a strong following in the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party.⁴⁹

Peter Merkl, a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, stressed the importance of the association between the church and the peace movement when he wrote in the SAIS Review during the summer of 1982. He also,

⁴⁷"New Political Groups," p. 3.

⁴⁸Mikhailov, p. 17.

⁴⁹Denitch, p. 5.

however, made a pertinent distinction when he noted that:

The allegations of Communist conspiracy behind the peace movement--to be distinguished from enthusiastic Communist approval--are less plausible in the Federal Republic with its tiny Communist parties than, say, in Italy or France.⁵⁰

Bogdan Denitch of Columbia University also asserted in the Winter 1982 issue of Dissent that the peace movement was now marked with a decided absence of both Communist leadership and pro-Russian slogans.⁵¹ Not everyone attributed such absence of communist leadership to the Krefeld Appeal, however. The Krefeld Appeal, in its most basic explanation, is a democratic petition against the rearmament of NATO.⁵²

There are a number of aspects of the Krefeld Appeal which are important. First, it has been signed by a substantial number people. Through the middle of 1982 the range of signatories was estimated from a low of one million up to a high of 1.5 million.⁵³ No references to the appeal were found in publications appearing after late 1982. This may have been the result of the waning of the signing process, reduced media coverage, or only scattered references. Heinz Suhr, a member of the Information Section (Presse Spreche) of the Greens, stated that by the middle of 1984 there were 4.5 million signatures on the Appeal. Linda Bullard of the "Euromissiles

⁵⁰Merk1, pp. 81-82.

⁵¹Denitch, p. 5.

⁵²Merk1, p. 84.

⁵³Ibid.; and Jones, p. 6.

Working Group" in Washington, D.C., noted that the Krefeld Appeal had served its purpose as an organizing tool and rallying point, but was not being actively used in July, 1984.⁵⁴

The second feature of the Krefeld Appeal which may be important concerns its genesis in November of 1980. Yost and Glad indicated that the appeal was reportedly launched by the German Communist Party.⁵⁵ Gerhard Wettig is less tenuous about a positive indication of origin, and he asserted that the appeal definitely was initiated by the German Communist Party (DKP) and its associated groups. He named the German Peace Union (Deutsche Friedens-Union, DFU) as a specific example of such associated groups. Wettig also wrote that the express purpose of the DKP was to collect two million signatures on the appeal, and Wettig provided annotations to support all of his allegations.⁵⁶

Communist connections aside, one item of extreme importance for the peace movement is the age structure of its support. Politically, large numbers of the Greens and alternative parties are also in concert with the policies and goals

⁵⁴Heinz Suhr and Linda Bullard provided this information to me telephonically. Unfortunately, Linda Bullard was unable to provide me with a copy of the Krefeld Appeal itself. Interview with Heinz Suhr, die Gruenen, Bonn, West Germany, 6 July 1984; and Interview with Linda Bullard, "Euromissiles Working Group," Washington, D.C., 6 July 1984.

⁵⁵Yost and Glad, p. 545.

⁵⁶Wettig, "Die neue Friedensbewegung," p. 222.

of the peace movement. Furthermore, there is a tremendous bias in the age groups which indicates that those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five are far more likely to support the movement than those over that age.

Writing in May of 1984 in Commentary, Stephen Haseler summed up his feelings about the peace movement's place in society when he said that "The fact is that nuclear pacifism, and the drive toward unilateral disarmament which accompanies it, are now a settled aspect of European life."⁵⁷ Unless the age structure changes dramatically in the future, there is every likelihood that the peace movement will become even more settled as time goes on.

As mentioned earlier, the broad base of support for the peace movement does not operate on a broad range of political issues. Nevertheless, there are splinters around the core issue of peace which are important to discuss, constantly keeping in mind that not every proponent of the peace movement agrees with each goal of the movement and that many who are in agreement with the majority goals are not unanimous in support of how those goals are to be accomplished. In mid-1982 the "German Information Center" described some of the goals of the peace movement:

There are organizations within the peace movement that demand unilateral disarmament; others avow a total pacifism. While some organizations within the movement address their demands to both East and West, others look

⁵⁷Stephen Haseler, "The Euromissile Crisis," Commentary 75 (May 1983): 28.

only to the West for concessions...

Thus, the peace movement appears to be a complex entity, whose common denominator is opposition to what it calls NATO's "rearmament" plans.⁵⁸

Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, quoted by Gerhard Wettig in Aussenpolitik in 1982, ascribed many of the same goals to the peace movement. He included active support for goals ranging from total pacifism to respect for the balanced strategy of NATO. Those against nuclear weapons and those who are in the peace movement at the behest of the "other side" are seeking their goals within the overall aura of the peace movement.⁵⁹ Wettig echoed the previously mentioned assertion of the "German Information Center" when he also identified opposition to the NATO Eurostrategic rearmament as the single common strand within the movement.⁶⁰

The actual stationing of the first missiles may have somewhat unravelled the common strand and thereby reduced the demonstrations in terms of numbers of participants, but it certainly has not eliminated the demonstrations. In April of 1984 the traditional Easter marches were conducted. Although the participation did not equal the previous year in numbers, the media gave good coverage and stressed the continued sig-

⁵⁸"New Political Groups," p. 3.

⁵⁹Peter Graf Kielmannsegg quoted in Wettig, "Die neue Friedensbewegung," p. 212.

⁶⁰Wettig, "Die neue Friedensbewegung," p. 212.

nificance of the movement.⁶¹ Associated Press reports of the events included 500 demonstrators at Garlstedt on 19 and 20 April, and 19,000 people in Hamburg with thousands more in the Ruhr area on 22 April.⁶² At Mutlangen some thirty-five demonstrators were forcibly removed after four demonstrators cut through a fence surrounding a storage site. It was reported that a U.S. Army guard fired three warning shots in order to halt their advance.⁶³ More than one thousand demonstrators gathered once again at Mutlangen on the 9th and 10th of June, and between 150 and 300 people peacefully protested at the U.S. Air Force base at Ramstein, although a smaller but more adamant group dumped about forty pounds of animal entrails at the entrance to the base before disappearing into the crowd of about 500,000 which was gathered for the open house and air show on 24 June.⁶⁴

Not all of the demonstrations have been fully reported in the press as many of them have been relatively small. The

⁶¹"Easter Protest Marchers," German Press Review 84 (18-1984): 4.

⁶²"Protestors block access to U.S. Army base," El Paso Times, 20 April 1984, p. 2-A; "Protestors demonstrate again near base," El Paso Times, 21 April 1984, p. 2-A; and "Germans march against new U.S. missiles," El Paso Times, 23 April 1984, p. 3-A.

⁶³"Missile protestors dragged away by police," El Paso Times, 22 April 1984, p. 8-A; and "Guard Fires Warning Shot at Protestors," Army Times, 7 May 1984, p. 2.

⁶⁴"16 arrested in Pershing missile protest," El Paso Times, 13 June 1984, p. 2-A; and "Animal entrails dumped at base to protest missiles," El Paso Times, 25 June 1984, p. 2-A.

numbers of participants have never again attained the dimensions of the October 1981 rally in Bonn. Nevertheless, the demonstrations continue, and they provide vivid input to the government policymakers which says that a dedicated group is not in agreement with the government policy.

Bogdan Denitch wrote that while the peace movement is skeptical about the Soviet Union, its main thrust is certainly directed against NATO and the relationship which NATO has with the United States. He went on to identify three factors which were motivating the peace movement:

1--A distrust of U.S. policymakers.

2--The fear that Europe will become the site of nuclear destruction.

3--The belief that the Russians are in fact not coming.⁶⁵

These latter three motivators identified by Denitch cannot be considered as goals themselves, but they can certainly be utilized to identify goals which Denitch would or would not describe as being within the scope of the peace movement.

Therefore, the peace movement has a number of features which are important to remember.

1--Its membership encompasses persons from a varied cross section of both the horizontal and vertical strata in West Germany.

2--The Greens and people under the age of thirty-six

⁶⁵Denitch, pp. 5-6.

are represented within the movement in excess of the demographic average.

3--Peace is the main issue, and there is no attempt to represent the full range of governmental responsibilities within the movement.

4--There are splinter goals under the main peace issue, and, within these splinter goals, opposition to NATO rearmament seems to be the singular common denominator for all members of the movement.

The demonstrations which are utilized by the peace movement to display public dissatisfaction with government policy are important political events. They have graphically demonstrated the amount of support which the peace movement has enjoyed. Nevertheless, neither the Krefeld Appeal nor the demonstrations were sufficient to stop the government from deploying Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. In analyzing the effect of demonstrations on government policy through the use of the model from chapter I, it appears that while the demonstrations were indeed frequent, and drew large numbers and also prominent participants, they did not change the government policy. Perhaps the numbers peaked too soon in the 1981 demonstrations or perhaps the government was sufficiently entrenched in its policy to evade successfully any pressures for change which the demonstrations developed.

Short term changes were not accomplished. In spite of that, the demonstrations have left an indelible mark on the

Federal Republic, and the peace movement is now optimistically looking toward the future.

Support from Greens
and Alternatives

Not all of the adherents of the peace movement are members of either the Green or Alternative parties. Conversely, and although the percentage of occurrence is admittedly smaller, not all members of the Greens or Alternatives are interested in the peace movement. Nevertheless, ignoring the linkages between these two parties and the peace movement would not provide a complete oversight of the political situation in which the peace movement exists.

Certainly the most salient distinction between the peace movement and the Green and Alternative parties is that the former is single-issue oriented, while the latter are concerned with politics in general and the operation of the entire government.⁶⁶ The Green party especially is a political organization which is involved in the parliamentary operation of the Federal Republic through its elected representatives. The peace movement does not elect its own representatives, but attempts to influence members of the Bundestag to vote in accordance with movement objectives on peace related issues, and further attempts to promote the election of new representatives who support their views.

There are differences in function as well as in scope,

⁶⁶Wagner, p. 160.

which is demonstrated by the decision of the Greens to disassociate themselves from a position advocating unilateral concessions from only the West--a position held by some portions of the peace movement.⁶⁷ This distinction applies to the Greens only, as the Alternatives are themselves dedicated to unilateral disarmament.⁶⁸ Despite the differences, however, the linkage between the parties and the movement has had an impact on the politics of West Germany which the distinctions have not superseded. The foremost impact of the linkage is the credibility which the Green party brings to the peace movement. The Greens are the focal point of the movement, and they have been able to provide prominent individuals who speak in support of the movement. These individuals include former NATO General Gert Bastian and Petra Kelly, spokeswoman for the Greens. Both are members of the Bundestag.⁶⁹ Credibility through the appearance of prominent individuals translates into broader electorate appeal and more elected representatives, a necessary step in working from within the governmental structure.

The Alternative movement traces its origin back to a

⁶⁷"New Political Groups," p. 3.

⁶⁸Sidney Lens, "A Look at 'Alternative' Germany," Win Magazine, January 1, 1982, p. 13.

⁶⁹Ed Hedemann, "The Rise of CD in West Germany," Win Magazine, October, 1983, pp. 14-15; In February 1984 Gerd Bastian withdrew from the Green party but remains in the Bundestag as an independent. Gerhard Spoerl, "Der General macht kehrt," die Zeit, Overseas ed., vol. 39, no. 8, 24 February 1984, p. 7.

basic lack of faith in the political structure of the state, and citizen's initiatives to protect individual rights against infringement by the government. Subsequently, more and more of the citizen's initiatives began to involve environmental issues, and this spawned the "green movement."⁷⁰ The Green Party itself was officially formed shortly after the unveiling of the NATO Two-Track decision in 1979.⁷¹

The Green party is certainly concerned about peace, and some of its specific goals regarding peace have included a ban on the deployment of new NATO Intermediate Range missiles under the two-track decision, the elimination of similar weapons held by the Warsaw Pact, the creation of a nuclear free zone throughout all of Europe, and the removal of foreign troops from stations abroad.⁷²

The Greens also supported the goals of the Krefeld Appeal and discounted claims that the appeal was initiated by the Soviet Union.⁷³ Nevertheless, Kelly was concerned about the Communist factions of the Greens who refused to admit that the problem was two-sided and that both NATO and the Warsaw

⁷⁰Lens, p. 12.

⁷¹Hedemann, p. 15.

⁷²"Die boese Farbe?" The Economist, March 13-19, 1982, p. 46; and "Green Bulletin," January 1984, Cologne, West Germany, p. 9.

⁷³Die Gruenen, "Peace Manifesto," 1982, Cologne, West Germany, p. 6.

Pact were to blame.⁷⁴ The Krefeld Appeal was directed at American and NATO weapons only, and did not include Soviet SS-20's, and therefore both Kelly and Bastian withdrew their individual support from the appeal in January 1984.⁷⁵

However, the Greens do not limit themselves to the peace issue, and the protection of the environment, elimination of Nuclear energy generating plants, and ending industrial growth are among the specific non-peace oriented goals which they advocate.⁷⁶ The broad range of goals is demonstrated by the four distinct factions which exist within the party. These are:

1--Visionary/Holistic Greens. They are concerned with comprehensive politics and moral, ideological, and inner development.

2--Eco-Greens. Also called "green Greens," their main issue is the environment.

3--Peace Movement Greens. Their initial priority is to stop the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. However, they also advocate demilitarization, social defense (active, non-violent resistance and non-cooperation), block-free thinking, and a regionalized global community (non-nationalistic).

⁷⁴Capra and Spretnak, p. 66.

⁷⁵Interview with Heinz Suhr, die Gruenen, Bonn, West Germany, 6 July 1984.

⁷⁶Wagner, p. 161.

4--Radical Left, Marxist Oriented Greens. These are called the "red Greens."⁷⁷

Predominately due to the influence of the Visionary/Holistic Greens, the party has adopted some traditional political programs which are related to neither the environment nor peace. These include a speed limit for all German roads and especially the Autobahns, the elimination of cigarette and liquor advertisements, a thirty-five hour work week, declarations against government bureaucracy and corruption, and guaranteed apprentice programs with the right to a job.⁷⁸

The goals of the Alternatives are often similar to the goals of the Greens, although the absence of a single national Alternative party precludes absolute comparisons. Nonetheless, the Alternatives do differ with the Greens in basic ideology. The Alternatives reject the consumer society and strive for a return to preindustrial society. They believe that "individual self-fulfillment" should take precedence over the demands and pressures of society.⁷⁹

The Greens and the Alternatives, especially the former, have made impressive gains at the ballot box during the 1980's. Both parties are represented in State and municipal legislatures.⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Greens obtained 3.2

⁷⁷Capra and Spretnak, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁸"New Political Groups," p. 2.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 4; and "Die boese Farbe?" p. 46.

percent of the German vote in the 1979 European Parliamentary elections which won them some seats in that body.⁸¹ Even more impressively, the Greens won two million votes in the March 1983 general election and currently have twenty-seven seats in the Bundestag as a result--the first new party to gain seats in more than thirty years.⁸² Subsequently, in the June 1984 elections for the European Parliament, the Greens received 8.2 percent of the vote, indicating that their portion of the electorate is continuing to rise.⁸³

The Greens and the Alternatives are distinct political parties, which the peace movement is not. However, it seems that a sufficient portion of the Green and Alternative momentum is consonant with the goals of the peace movement and they provide political legitimacy for those goals.

Analysis of the Peace Movement

The peace movement has attracted quite a bit of attention on a world-wide basis. The politicians are certainly keeping a close watch on the movement, and so are scholars. The scholars and other analysts have provided the academic journals and political publications with some of their analyses regarding the movement are pertinent to this study. In particular, analysis of the purpose and effectiveness of

⁸¹Lens, p. 12; and Hedemann, p. 15.

⁸²Hedemann, p. 15; and Capra and Spretnak, p. xiii.

⁸³"Europawahl: Zehn nationale Stimmungsbarometer," p. 7.

the peace movement have a place here, and some warnings or cautions are also important to convey.

The stated purpose of the peace movement is ensconced within its name. The German physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker noted that:

...the European peace movement is not essentially anti-American, and it is not pro-Soviet by any stretch of the imagination. It is not even primarily neutralist. Its motive is much simpler. It is anxiety as to man's survival, and this anxiety is, I say, warranted. At least in respect of the German peace movement I can say for sure that it has so far had but one clearly formulated political objective, that of preventing the stationing in western Europe, especially our own country, of wide-ranging intermediate-range nuclear missiles. It is afraid that the presence of these missiles might lead to a crushing Soviet pre-emptive strike against our countries on the day the deterrent fails to deter.⁸⁴

Fear of nuclear weapons and fear of the Soviet Union are widely cited as reasons for support of the peace movement.⁸⁵ The word Angst, fear or anxiety, is often used by the members of the peace movement. Nuclear destruction is the proximate fear, and although it can come from East or West, the rationale is that if U.S. weapons are not on European soil, then the Soviets would have no incentive to utilize their nuclear weapons against Western Europe. That is sound logic, although it may not be the complete picture. One aspect of the German movement which distinguishes it from the two other West European countries with large numbers of wea-

⁸⁴Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, "Deterrence--just a breathing space?" Die Zeit, 26 March 1982, in The German Tribune, no. 37 (1982), p. 9.

⁸⁵"Don't ban the bomb," p. 9; and Mertes, p. 190.

pons in their stockpiles, France and Great Britain, is that the Germans do not possess any weapons of their own. West Germany is totally dependent upon the United States for nuclear weapons and their release. Certain facets of the peace movement see this dependence as contrary to the national interest of West Germany.⁸⁶

American policies also alarm and thereby motivate members of the peace movement, and perhaps also generate a degree of public support from non-activists. Presidential Directive 59, which was pronounced by President Jimmy Carter, is undoubtedly one such policy. The directive emphasizes that American nuclear weapons will be targeted largely on Soviet offensive forces.⁸⁷ This can be destabilizing, as such selective missions can raise the possibility of use as surgical preemptive strikes.⁸⁸

Furthermore, President Ronald Reagan has taken a strong anti-Soviet stand. This has raised fears in West Germany that such a posture might engender conflict.⁸⁹ In addition to the rhetoric, Reagan's actions, including the decision to deploy the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,

⁸⁶Christopher Coker and Heinz Schulte, "Strategiekritik und Pazifismus: Zwei Haupttendenzen in den westeuropäischen Friedensbewegungen," Europa-Archiv 38 (14-1983): 414.

⁸⁷Stanley Hoffman, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason," Foreign Affairs 60 (Summer 1982): 334.

⁸⁸Voight, p. 154.

⁸⁹Driscoll, pp. 196 & 202.

have concerned the peace activists.⁹⁰ Interestingly enough, had Reagan not advocated the MX stationing it might have been impossible to have received support from anyone in Europe to station any type of new missiles there.⁹¹

A release from the German Ministry of Defense analyzed the German peace movement as more radical than that in the United States, and more likely to utilize unconventional and aggressive behavior. The release also identified some political and social forces which could mold the peace movement in West Germany. Included were:

- 1--Moral and radical pacifism in the Christian churches.
- 2--Dissatisfaction with political parties and the state.
- 3--The ecology movement.
- 4--Youth protest and citizen's initiatives.
- 5--Communist groups.
- 6--Trade unions and parts of the SPD.⁹²

Stanley Hoffman pointed out that support to join the European movement could emanate from very worthwhile motivation. He specifically mentioned the rejection of a militaristic past and worry and anger about the tendency of governments to place weapons in a higher priority than the economy and

⁹⁰Hoffman, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons," p. 334.

⁹¹Driscoll, p. 204.

⁹²Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, pp. 2, 3, & 7.

unemployment.⁹³ Hoffman, like the other analysts, freely lauded just about every purpose of and the motivation behind the peace movement--the alleged Communist influence being the major exception. However, how best to reach the purpose is not at all so commonly hailed.

Purpose, however, is mere metaphysical maneuvering if a political movement does not achieve some modicum of concrete success. The fact is that the peace movement did not succeed in stopping the planned deployment of new Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons in accordance with the NATO Two-Track decision. The first deployments took place in December 1983 in spite of the efforts of the peace movement. This does not mean that the peace movement is at an end, but it does not help to lose the first major confrontation. In mid-1982, Gert Schmidinger wrote in the Saarbruecker Zeitung that the peace movement had been gaining strength based largely upon a diminished confidence in the reliability of the foreign policy of the United States.⁹⁴ That statement was made back in the halcyon days of the movement, at least when gauged on the basis of numbers of demonstrators. Subsequently, the numbers have somewhat diminished. According to the previously mentioned Ministry of Defense release:

The peace movement has been losing political sway

⁹³Hoffman, "American Liberals," p. 150.

⁹⁴Gert Schmidinger, "The peace movement and what it stands for," Saarbruecker Zeitung, 14 May 1982, in The German Tribune, no. 37 (1982), p. 13.

since the summer of 1982. Less people are taking part in its actions. The reasons are probably these:

--The supporters of the peace movement are beginning to realize that they cannot gain any political majorities.

--If the Geneva negotiations go awry, they cannot prevent stationing.

--There is internal quarreling in the peace movement on the question of using violence in its actions and the influence of communist forces.

--Its parliamentary basis has shrunk as a result of the state government election returns in Bremen and Hesse on the 25th of September this year.⁹⁵

The release was dated 31 October 1983 and the source insures that the position of the release is the position of the government. Nonetheless, it does point out some of the problems which the peace movement has had in meeting its goals.

This is not to say, however, that the peace movement has been totally ineffective. Karl E. Birnbaum noted in early 1984, writing in the Europa-Archiv, that Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker had stated in 1974 that "the politics of prevention of war must be able to discuss 'Angst'"⁹⁶ Birnbaum asserts that the peace movement of the early 1980's has at least accomplished this. Angst can be discussed and debated, and responsible politicians in the West understand the importance of open intercourse regarding questions of war and peace.⁹⁷

⁹⁵Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, p. 9.

⁹⁶Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker quoted in Karl E. Birnbaum, "Friedenssicherung, atomare Bedrohung und oeffentliche Meinung," Europa-Archiv 39 (3-1984): 79.

⁹⁷Birnbaum, p. 79.

The limited effectiveness of the peace movement in attaining its goals is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that it is a relatively new movement which directly challenges much of the status quo. While, as previously mentioned, many agree with the purpose of the movement, the methodology has come under scrutiny and both opponents and neutral scholars have provided criticism, warnings and suggestions to the peace movement.

Fear of the Soviet Union and fear of nuclear weapons is valid, but it is not a sound argument as the basis for the peace movement. The Economist magazine, arguing that a world without nuclear weapons cannot be recreated, but that nuclear weapons have likely contributed to the unprecedented peace in Europe, put it this way:

If the argument against throwing away nuclear weapons is that these things are the only way of avoiding either a war with Russia or capitulation to Russian demands, then the growth in Russian power does not weaken the pro-nuclear argument; it strengthens it.⁹⁸

Alois Mertes noted that many in the peace movement presented the argument that they did not feel pressured by the Soviet Union, but were more concerned about American weapons placed on German soil and the risk of uncontrolled war which these weapons engendered. Mertes warned, however, that this argument based itself solely on fear of war, and ignored the political consequences encountered when insufficient defenses

⁹⁸"Don't ban the bomb," pp. 9-10.

are maintained through fear in the name of peace.⁹⁹

Theo Waigel, in echoing this concern, noted that it is possible to live without weapons when a consensus exists concerning the rights of both peace and freedom. He pointed out that the Federal Republic did not have to maintain defenses to secure their mutual rights with the Netherlands, Belgium and France, but that no such consensus exists with the Soviet Union. Unilateral fear of war resulting in a unqualified search for peace would result in paying the price of freedom for that peace.¹⁰⁰

Former Minister of Defense and the current leader of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, expounded upon the peace without freedom theme in a 1982 interview. Strauss said that:

Peace without freedom means peace of the churchyard. Freedom without peace means waiting in fear. Without freedom there can be no lasting peace and no human value for life.

Strauss continued by warning that appeasement politics today would be more dangerous than that which Neville Chamberlain attempted, because in contrast to Hitler's blind ambition, the Kremlin knows exactly what it wants and how to react to situations of risk. The Soviet Union does not want to start the Third World War, but it does want to change the political situation in Europe. It can do this with reduced risk if the peace movement succeeds in accomplishing unilateral disarmament.

⁹⁹Mertes, p. 190.

¹⁰⁰Theo Waigel, "Offensive Friedenspolitik," Politische Studien 33 (January/February 1982): 60-61.

ment in the West.¹⁰¹

In analyzing the peace movement, Wilfried von Bredow recounted three basic problems that the peace movement was encountering:

1--Its amateurism regarding military strategy.

2--Its one-sided political nature, through which the Soviet Union has profited.

3--Its lack of experience in the basic rules of political operations.¹⁰²

Professor Stanley Hoffman reiterated these problems as he delineated three reasons that he was critical of the peace movement:

1--Part of the movement was not directed against policies of the United States, but was against post-war Americanization in general.

2--Although the deepest impulses of the movement are apolitical, the results are very political, but at the same time are clumsy and defective. While the purpose of the movement may not be directed solely at the West, the thrust of

¹⁰¹Franz Josef Strauss, "Der Friede erstrangiges Ziel der Politik," Politische Studien 33 (January/February 1982): 9-10.

¹⁰²von Bredow, p. 59. The problems for the peace movement are not unusual. As pointed out by Gabriel A. Almond, "...two characteristics of national security policy--the technical nature of the problems and the security of some of the essential information--combine to produce a shallow base for public discussion of security policy issues." Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Summer 1956): 372.

its demonstrations has had that result. Furthermore, the mere denuclearization of Europe would favor the Soviets, whose conventional armaments exceed those of NATO. A conventional war alone would devastate Europe, and therefore any security policy must take a balanced approach including both nuclear and conventional capabilities.

3--Its focus on the actions of the West has caused it to seriously misread the intentions of the Soviets.

There is little in the history of the arms race to suggest that, in the absence of NATO's initiative of December 1979, the Soviets would have either stopped the deployment of their new weapons aimed at Western Europe or started to dismantle them.

The growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the 1970's--the very time when, in several respects although assuredly not all, the American effort slowed down--makes one wonder whether any kind of unilateral disarmament in the West would be reciprocated.¹⁰³

Theo Waigel questioned the members of the peace movement on its one-sided nature. He asked why the plans of the West were being attacked, while the actions of the East were being ignored, and why the movement did not demonstrate against the weekly increases in numbers of SS-20's being targeted against Western Europe when Brezhnev visited Bonn in November 1981. Waigel continued by noting the conspicuous lack of demonstrations against Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and elsewhere throughout the world, and asked the members of the peace movement to explain this.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Hoffman, "American Liberals," pp. 148-50.

¹⁰⁴Waigel, p. 62.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker also cautioned the peace movement about forcing only unilateral concessions. Weizsaecker recalled that he had opposed plans for additional missiles both before and after NATO's 1979 agreement, but that:

...I have never advocated the simplistic formula that the alternative to missiles is no missiles. It ought to read: the alternative to missiles on both sides is no missiles on either side.¹⁰⁵

Weizsaecker continued that he was not calling on the peace movement to be inactive, but that if NATO's missiles were not stationed in Europe, then what incentive would the Soviet Union have for disarming herself? Deterrence is useful only if it is credible, and if the other side believes that it can be carried out. The peace movement must seek comprehensive alternatives. Weizsaecker closed with two warnings, one special and one general:

The special one is that if they were to succeed in preventing the stationing of missiles on German soil they would have reduced the likelihood of a war, if one were to break out, wiping out the entire German people in a matter of minutes, and that would be a substantial achievement. But it would not have reduced the likelihood of war breaking out, and if this success were to result in a major domestic confrontation and Nato being shaken to the foundations, it might well make war more likely.

The general is that those who would have us follow Christ's message in the Sermon on the Mount must be prepared to accept loss of political freedom as the price to be paid....the immediate result of a unilateral renunciation of the use of force would by no means stabilize peace. It would be seen by the other side as a

¹⁰⁵ von Weizsaecker, p. 9.

sign of political weakness and susceptibility to blackmail.¹⁰⁶

Much of what has been written was printed prior to the initial stationing of missiles. Other than the fact that prevention of stationing of new NATO missiles was the priority of the peace movement, and that they failed in meeting that goal, the warnings to the peace movement remain valid. The movement is not likely to pass away based upon one failure--albeit major. Nonetheless, the cautions expressed by scholars must be heeded if the fledgling movement is to gain stronger political acceptance, expand its popular appeal, and perhaps have a chance in the future to enhance a real and lasting peace in Europe.

Trends and Prognosis

It would be a mistake to assess the strength or influence of public opinion and the peace movement based solely upon the raw numerical data from public opinion polls or the frequency of demonstrations and the number of participants. Therefore, some careful analysis might shed some more meaningful light on the actual pertinence of the information in this chapter.

An analysis of public opinion in the Federal Republic does not yield universally accepted results. A perusal of radical left publications raises some interesting points which might not appear in a more balanced source. Ed Hedeman, a

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 9-12.

national staff member of the War Resisters League in the United States, wrote in Win Magazine in October 1983 that:

One of the reasons the German peace movement was so galvanized by the 1979 deployment decision of the Pershing II and cruise missiles was the continuing resentment of military occupation. Although many Americans may be aware that there are 300,000 American soldiers in Germany, it is hard to fully comprehend until you travel around this country, with a land area the size of Oregon.¹⁰⁷

A. Grigoryants, in the June 1981 issue of the Moscow-Published International Affairs, noted two aspects of public opinion which were developing. First, he pointed out that more Germans were beginning to understand that the United States was trying to redistribute the nuclear risk within NATO by stationing missiles in Western Europe. He went on to assert that many Germans were asking the very basic question about German foreign policy, to wit, how closely do the foreign interests of the United States coincide with those of the Federal Republic? Grigoryants continued in a not atypical style that:

The man in the street in the FRG is reassessing values; this is especially symptomatic for the years of the propaganda in the country of the cult of America, which has assumed an enormous scope: the language is cluttered with Americanisms; spiritual life is submerged by the flood of low-grade overseas mass culture; dubious tastes and habits imported from across the Atlantic are taking root. And in politics, ready loyalty to Washington is considered as the supreme virtue.¹⁰⁸

Pierre Hassner wrote in the Fall 1982 issue of Foreign

¹⁰⁷Hedeman, p. 15.

¹⁰⁸A. Grigoryants, "The FRG: In the Snares of 'Nachruestung'," International Affairs: Moscow, no. 6 (June 1981), pp. 104-106.

Policy that there were a number of factors developing in German public opinion:

1--There has been a distinct shift to the political right both in the United States and West Germany. However, in West Germany the left has "maintained, even strengthened, its dominance of intellectual life and the media."

2--A 1981 Allensbach poll indicated that while there was a very strong correlation between attitudes in the U.S. and the Federal Republic on NATO, nuclear weapons, and foreign policy, there was a strong divergence on issues such as social and psychological values.

3--The rise of citizen's initiatives in Germany is directly linked to the weakening of the power of political parties there.

4--There is a striking divergence in the German polls based upon age. Those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five are much more likely to be sympathetic to environmental and alternative politics--which includes the peace movement.¹⁰⁹

Concerning the active demonstration issue, it would be relatively easy to point to the lower number of demonstrators and thereby proclaim that the movement was losing strength. A release by the Ministry of Defense in November 1983 said exactly that when it noted that "The peace movement has been

¹⁰⁹Pierre Hassner, "The Shifting Foundation," Foreign Policy 48 (Fall 1982): 3-6.

losing political sway since the summer of 1982. Less people are taking part in its actions." However, the Defense release somewhat less dogmatically indicated in closing that "the peace movement will continue to constitute an important domestic political factor in the Federal Republic of Germany."¹¹⁰ In May of 1984 the German Press Review compiled some media evaluations in the wake of the Easter Marches which included the issues of:

23 April Sueddeutsche Rundfunk:

Those who believed or even hoped that the peace movement has expired...made a mistake. Proof of that are the many demonstrations throughout the nation. But the demonstrators on their part are wrong if they believe that they can make even the slightest dent in the next few months.

24 April Stuttgarter Zeitung:

Comments heard here and there about the demise of the peace movement have no validity. The arms race is one theme that has forever been absorbed by all the people...And the fact that, with some exceptions, the demonstrations were of a peaceful nature should not surprise anyone after the massive demonstrations last fall...

24 April Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung:

(The fact that fewer people joined in the marches and that some tried to turn them into agitation for labor union demands for a shorter work week) could lead to the conclusion that the (peace movement) will suffer the same fate of sectionalism that affected the marchers of the 1950's...But the new realization that the arms race simply cannot continue in its present form is without a doubt the result of actions by a global peace movement. It encompasses more people by far than seems to be indicated by the number of participants in marches and demonstrations. And it appears that this will also be the case in the future.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, p. 9-10.

¹¹¹"Easter Protest Marchers," German Press Review 84 (18-1984): 4-5.

The recent trends which have seen fewer participants superficially seems to indicate that the peace movement is losing support, but the analysis of those watching the situations--including the defense ministry--tends to underplay the reduced numbers. Factors other than loss of support explain the reduction. One thing that is clear, however, is that the primary objectives of the demonstrations, both large and small, have not been met. NATO still exists, the deployment of the Pershing II's and Cruise Missiles began as scheduled, and the Soviet Union has not withdrawn any of its Intermediate Range missiles. Nonetheless, while these objectives have not been met in the short term, the long term influence of the movement in meeting some goals may still be gaining considerable momentum and may be a force of substantial stature in the not too distant future.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined one small part in the political life of a country, only one issue and a small segment of that single issue. Irrespective of the narrow scope, the topic concerns an issue upon which the very existence of Europe itself might some day hinge--nuclear weapons. The fact that the citizens of West Germany are much closer on a daily basis to both the weapons and the potential adversary they are designed to deter makes them keenly aware of the dilemma which they face. While some maintain their indifference, the majority continue to harbor deep feelings about a small issue, but one which is both important and multifaceted. Those who feel and think that nuclear weapons are necessary are doing so out of a genuine conviction that they are necessary components of a credible defense which can maintain both peace and freedom in Europe. Those opposed to the weapons fear that the horrible possibilities that nuclear destruction would bring are too real a consequence. Given continued confrontation, warhead to warhead, there is little chance that the single mistake which would trigger destruction can be avoided for an interminable time into the future. They feel that the threat can be thwarted by means other than nuclear weapons.

This thesis has not attempted to solve this dilemma.

Rather, its purpose has been to find out what influence rising public opinion against the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles under provisions of the NATO Two-Track decision has had on the government policies which have advocated such stationing.

The thesis began with a theoretical discussion and an examination of previous works in the general area of public opinion, followed by the construction of a model which was developed substantially from the general works which were discussed (chapter I). The model, in its final form, consists of public opinion influencing government policies through a filter. All components are considered in light of the change, or lack thereof, which the model brings to light.

After the presentation of some background material on the Federal Republic of Germany, the next two chapters discussed and examined government policy and public opinion respectively. Where pertinent, specific reference to the model was pointed out. In concluding the results of the entire thesis, the model will be used to highlight those findings which are most pertinent to this particular subject.

The first intermediate question which was posed in the Introduction was "What is the feeling of government officials concerning the weaponry, and are there any identifiable trends of change?" This question addresses the "government policy" block in the model. Two of the distinct expressions of the government policy block have undergone change during the past

two years. The government coalition consisting of the SPD and FDP was replaced by the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition. Along with this change, control passed from the Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt (SPD) to that of Helmut Kohl (CDU). Nevertheless, the statements and actions remained unchanged. The majority member of the previous coalition, the SPD, initiated actions and proposed the policy of the Federal Republic's commitment to the NATO Two-Track decision. However, internal problems within the SPD caused a division which seriously threatened the sustainment of the policy which the party itself had espoused. When the coalition changed and control changed, the new coalition maintained the same policy in both actions and statements regarding the NATO Two-Track decision. The new coalition was, unlike its predecessor, secure in its commitment to the policy. It is an interesting twist, but the result is that government policy in terms of statements and actions has not changed with respect to deployment on missiles under provisions of the two-track decision.

The second intermediate question was "What is the trend in public opinion and dissent concerning the weaponry? This includes age and party demographics and a prognosis." Chapter IV addressed this question, and the "public opinion" block of the model is used to organize the results.

Polls had been taken by different organizations asking different questions and the results were widely publicized. There were certainly changes noted in the polls which indi-

cated that fewer people considered nuclear weapons to be the necessary pragmatic choice. In spite of the gradual trend the changes were neither large nor sustained. Furthermore, while the issue was most certainly salient, the latest poll showed that there was a marked drop in those who felt that nuclear weapons and war were the most urgent problems of the time.

The results of the demonstrations showed a similar indication. Demonstrations are still frequently held, but the participation has never again reached the level of the Fall 1981 demonstrations.

Elections were covered in chapters II and III. The March 1983 elections were touted as a popular mandate by Chancellor Kohl, and both the 89 percent participation and the more than 55 percent plurality which the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition received indicated that the general electorate was in consonance with the policies which the coalition supported and pursued. The elections supported the change in coalition which the Bundestag had initiated five months prior, but that change in coalition embodied a maintenance of the previous policy concerning the NATO Two-Track decision.

One aspect of the elections is important for a prognosis, however, and that is the growing support which the Greens received and the tendency of the young to be less in favor of the current policies than the older generations. The support for the Greens grew even more during the European Parliament elections held in June of 1984, and their continued

growth bears future attention. The concomitant phenomenon of the demographic split by age makes this prognosis even more important.

The "filter" in the model has played perhaps a mixed role in this case. As indicated by the various interpretations of poll results which caused television commentator Horst Schaettle to conclude that three quarters of the population opposed government policies and moved pollster Elisabeth Noelle-Nuemann to rebuke his conclusion, there is a difficulty in determining exactly what public opinion on this matter might really be. This assists the government in maintaining its policy, because the lack of a clearly defined opposition allows the government to act with relative impunity. Additionally, the representation system which allows political parties to appoint half of the members of the Bundestag engenders a higher ratio of support for the party line and rewards party loyalty, which obviously helps to insulate the government from the effects and influence of public opinion. The press, on the other side, are more liberal than the population as a whole, and therefore have provided extensive and supportive coverage for demonstrations. The press component, then, has actually caused the filter to amplify public opinion on this issue, and has perhaps balanced some of the dampening effect which the remainder of the filter has caused.

The final intermediate question which was answered was "Are all types of weapons involved in the dissent or just

particular classes of such weapons?" The NATO Two-Track decision was the focus of this thesis, and that decision involved Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. The two-track decision was also the proximate cause of many demonstrations and was also the main issue around which protest demonstrations were conducted. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons in general are not favorably looked upon in the Federal Republic. Overall, the West Germans are not anti-American, anti-defense, or anti-NATO. When nuclear weapons of any sort enter the picture, however, the responses and attitudes become markedly more negative. West Germans do not like nuclear weapons--of any kind.

In answer to the final question, the government has been able to continue to implement the NATO Two-Track decision in the face of demonstrations against such deployment. There was no clear public consensus developed against the stationing by the polls, even though nuclear weapons themselves are not at all popular in the Federal Republic. There have been massive demonstrations in protest against the missiles, but they seemed to have peaked in number of participants in the Fall of 1981. The demonstrations specifically, and public opinion in general, have not been able to halt the deployment of the missiles.

This is not to say that public opinion has not made an impact on government policy. The dogmatic response would be that the demonstrations failed. A more studied response would

be that the demonstrations have failed to cause radical short-term changes in government policy. At the same time, however, people are more conscious of the issue and they are addressing it, and they are voting. The young are showing a decided swing in the direction of looking for alternatives to nuclear weapons, and the major conventional political body which supports the goals of the peace movement, the Green party, is growing in strength at each subsequent election. The future might very well see a new approach by the West Germans to insure that they maintain their coveted goal of peace with freedom.

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